多内容提供方对等服务支付机制的合理性与公平性
On the Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers: Rationality and Fairness
摘要：
本文利用联盟博弈理论研究了多个内容提供方存在时对等辅助服务中合作的激励结构及其稳定性。我们首先考虑一个广义的联盟结构，包括多个供应商与许多协助同行，同行协助供应商，以减少运营成本的内容分发。为了将成本降低的利润分配给玩家（即，供应商和同行），我们然后建立了一个通用的公式，个人的收益时，采用“Shapley”的回报机制。我们发现，大联盟是不稳定的，即使当运营成本函数是凹的，这是在最近研究的情况下，一个单一的供应商的大联盟是稳定的形成鲜明对比。我们还表明，无论大联盟的稳定性，总是存在的联盟结构，这是不收敛到大联盟之间的动态联盟结构。我们的研究结果给了我们一个不可否认的事实，即一个提供者不倾向于与其他提供者合作，在同行协助服务，并从他们分开。三个方面的非合作（自私）供应商说明：（一）支付过低的同行，（二）服务垄断，（三）振荡联盟结构。最后，我们提出了一个稳定的支付机制，提高了公平的利润分享，通过调节自私的球员，以及授予内容提供方有限的现实谈判的权利。我们的研究提出了许多新的问题，如现实和有效的激励结构和公平性和个体提供者之间的竞争在同行辅助服务的权衡。
英文摘要：
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a "Shapley-like" payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures which are not convergent to the grand coalition under a dynamic among coalition structures. Our results give us an incontestable fact that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services, and be separated from them. Three facets of the noncooperative (selfish) providers are illustrated; (i) underpaid peers, (ii) service monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Lastly, we propose a stable payoff mechanism which improves fairness of profit-sharing by regulating the selfishness of the players as well as grants the content providers a limited right of realistic bargaining. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers' competition in peer-assisted services.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
