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arXiv 1010.0047cs.GT
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一次性囚徒困境的非合作Pareto有效解

A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Haoyang Wu

摘要:

囚徒困境是一个简单的模型,它抓住了个体理性和整体理性之间的本质矛盾。虽然一次性囚徒困境通常被认为是简单的,但在本文中,我们将其分为五种不同的类型。对于4型囚徒困境博弈,我们将提出一个自我执行的算法模型,以帮助非合作代理人获得帕累托有效的回报。算法模型基于使用复数的算法,并且可以在宏应用中工作。

英文摘要:

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it into five different types. For the type-4 Prisoner's Dilemma game, we will propose a self-enforcing algorithmic model to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs. The algorithmic model is based on an algorithm using complex numbers and can work in macro applications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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