关于迭代囚徒困境或好人先生和科萨·诺斯特拉的一些获胜策略
On some winning strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma or Mr. Nice Guy and the Cosa Nostra
摘要：
我们在2004年和2005年向Graham Kendall，Paul Darwen和Xin Yao组织的迭代囚徒困境（IPD）竞赛提交了两种策略。我们的战略在这两年都表现得非常好。一种类型是我们命名为OmegaTitForTat的众所周知的TitForTat策略的智能和乐观的增强版本。它识别常见的行为模式，并检测和恢复可修复的相互缺陷死锁情况，否则表现得很像TitForTat。第二种类型由一组作为团队一起工作的策略组成。这些群体策略中有一个杰出的个体教父策略，即扮演OmegaTitForTat对抗非成员，同时从他的群体其他成员的行为中大量获利，杀手。杀手心甘情愿地让自己被教父虐待，同时尽可能地降低所有其他玩家的分数，从而进一步最大限度地提高教父相对于其他参与者的表现。在简化的重复囚徒困境框架下对共谋的研究使我们能够与自然界和人类社会中现实的许多共同方面进行比较，从而进一步扩展了重复囚徒困境的范围，作为一个新的自然方向上合作行为研究的隐喻。我们进一步提供的证据表明，这将是不可避免的，这样的组策略将主导所有未来的迭代囚徒困境的竞争，因为它们可以偷偷伪装成非组策略与任意微妙。此外，我们表明，一般的问题，识别隐形共谋战略是不可判定的理论意义上。
英文摘要：
We submitted two kinds of strategies to the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) competitions organized by Graham Kendall, Paul Darwen and Xin Yao in 2004 and 2005. Our strategies performed exceedingly well in both years. One type is an intelligent and optimistic enhanced version of the well known TitForTat strategy which we named OmegaTitForTat. It recognizes common behaviour patterns and detects and recovers from repairable mutual defect deadlock situations, otherwise behaving much like TitForTat. The second type consists of a set of strategies working together as a team. These group strategies have one distinguished individual Godfather strategy that plays OmegaTitForTat against non-members while heavily profiting from the behaviour of the other members of his group, the Hitman. The Hitman willingly let themselves being abused by their Godfather while themselves lowering the scores of all other players as much as possible, thus further maximizing the performance of their Godfather in relation to other participants. The study of collusion in the simplified framework of the iterated prisoner's dilemma allows us to draw parallels to many common aspects of reality both in Nature as well as Human Society, and therefore further extends the scope of the iterated prisoner's dilemma as a metaphor for the study of cooperative behaviour in a new and natural direction. We further provide evidence that it will be unavoidable that such group strategies will dominate all future iterated prisoner's dilemma competitions as they can be stealthy camouflaged as non-group strategies with arbitrary subtlety. Moreover, we show that the general problem of recognizing stealth colluding strategies is undecidable in the theoretical sense.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
