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arXiv 1003.5385cs.CR
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代数性质下安全协议的类型缺陷攻击

How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties

Sreekanth Malladi, Pascal Lafourcade

摘要:

类型缺陷攻击安全协议,其中代理导致误解的消息类型已在文献中频繁报道。防止它们对于协议安全和验证至关重要。Heather等人证明,在自由消息代数和完美加密系统下,用其类型标记每个消息字段可以防止所有类型缺陷攻击。在本文中,我们证明了类型缺陷攻击可以防止相同的技术,即使在ACUN代数性质的XOR,这是常用的“现实世界”的协议,如SSL 3.0。我们的证明方法是通用的,可以很容易地扩展到其他monoidal运营商,拥有的性质,如逆和Idemonial以及。本文还讨论了在配对结合性、交换加密、前缀性质和同态加密等其他性质下,如何利用标记来防止类型缺陷攻击。

英文摘要:

Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system. In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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