一种新的超轻量RFID协议的安全缺陷
Security Flaws in a Recent Ultralightweight RFID Protocol
摘要：
在2006年，Peris-Lopez等人[1，2，3]发起了超轻量RFID协议的设计-使用UMAP协议家族-仅涉及简单的按位逻辑或算术运算，例如按位XOR，OR，AND和加法。后来发现，这种联合行动不足以保障安全。然后，Chien等人提出了SASI协议[4]，目的是通过将按位旋转添加到支持的操作集合中来提供更好的安全性。SASI协议代表了超轻量协议设计中的一个里程碑，尽管已经发表了针对该方案的某些攻击[5，6，7]。2008年，一个名为Gossamer的新协议被提出，可以被认为是UMAP家族和SASI的进一步发展。虽然没有针对Gossamer的攻击发表，Lee等人[9]最近发表了一个替代方案，该方案非常令人想起SASI。在本文中，我们表明Lee等人。的方案未能达到其许多安全目标，容易受到几种重要的攻击，如可追溯性，完全披露，克隆和反克隆。
英文摘要：
In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. [1, 2, 3] initiated the design of ultralightweight RFID protocols -with the UMAP family of protocols- involving only simple bitwise logical or arithmetic operations such as bitwise XOR, OR, AND, and addition. This combination of operations was revealed later to be insufficient for security. Then, Chien et al. proposed the SASI protocol [4] with the aim of offering better security, by adding the bitwise rotation to the set of supported operations. The SASI protocol represented a milestone in the design of ultralightweight protocols, although certain attacks have been published against this scheme [5, 6, 7]. In 2008, a new protocol, named Gossamer [8], was proposed that can be considered a further development of both the UMAP family and SASI. Although no attacks have been published against Gossamer, Lee et al. [9] have recently published an alternative scheme that is highly reminiscent of SASI. In this paper, we show that Lee et al.'s scheme fails short of many of its security objectives, being vulnerable to several important attacks like traceability, full disclosure, cloning and desynchronization.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
