自适应网络中渐近完全合作的同宿路径及其失效
A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure
摘要：
我们考虑了自适应网络上合作博弈的演化动力学，其中代理的策略（合作或背叛）反馈到它们的局部交互拓扑上。虽然相互合作是社会的最佳选择，但单方面背叛会产生更高的回报，并破坏合作的演变。虽然没有先验优势给予合作者，一个内在的动力机制，可以导致渐进的充分合作的状态。在有限系统中，这种状态的特征是长时间的强合作被突然发生的主要背叛所打断，这表明现实世界系统中合作的系统性失败可能是一种机制。
英文摘要：
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents (cooperation or defection) feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff and undermines the evolution of cooperation. Although no a priori advantage is given to cooperators, an intrinsic dynamical mechanism can lead asymptotically to a state of full cooperation. In finite systems, this state is characterized by long periods of strong cooperation interrupted by sudden episodes of predominant defection, suggesting a possible mechanism for the systemic failure of cooperation in real-world systems.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
