arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 0908.1613cs.GT
收藏

线性耦合通信对策

Linearly Coupled Communication Games

Yi Su, Mihaela van der Schaar

摘要:

本文讨论了一种特殊类型的多用户通信场景,其中用户的效用受到竞争对手行为的线性影响。首先,我们明确的纳什均衡和帕累托边界的可实现的效用区域的特点。其次,量化了非合作纳什策略所导致的无政府状态的无政府代价。第三,为了提高在非合作的情况下的性能,我们研究了一个替代的解决方案的概念,名为平衡,其中个人用户补偿他们缺乏信息,形成内部的信念,他们的竞争对手的属性。分析了最佳响应和Jacobi更新动态的全局收敛性,并证明了其收敛性。结果表明,帕累托边界的线性耦合游戏可以持续稳定的生态平衡,如果信任函数被适当地初始化。所研究的模型适用于多种实际应用中遇到的多址接入设计,包括无线随机接入和流量控制。

英文摘要:

This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users' utilities are linearly impacted by their competitors' actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and Pareto boundary of the achievable utility region. Second, the price of anarchy incurred by the non-collaborative Nash strategy is quantified. Third, to improve the performance in the non-cooperative scenarios, we investigate the properties of an alternative solution concept named conjectural equilibrium, in which individual users compensate for their lack of information by forming internal beliefs about their competitors. The global convergence of the best response and Jacobi update dynamics that achieve various conjectural equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that the Pareto boundaries of the investigated linearly coupled games can be sustained as stable conjectural equilibria if the belief functions are properly initialized. The investigated models apply to a variety of realistic applications encountered in the multiple access design, including wireless random access and flow control.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑