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arXiv 0901.3482cs.CR
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对哈佛体系结构设备的代码注入攻击

Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices

Aurélien Francillon, Claude Castelluccia

摘要:

哈佛架构CPU设计在嵌入式世界中很常见。基于哈佛架构的设备的例子是Mica系列无线传感器。云母微粒的内存有限,只能处理非常小的数据包。因此,将代码注入堆栈然后执行它的基于堆栈的缓冲区溢出技术不适用。人们普遍认为代码注入在哈佛架构上是不可能的。本文提出了一种针对云母传感器的远程代码注入攻击。我们展示了如何利用程序漏洞将任何代码永久注入Atmel AVR传感器的程序内存。据我们所知,这是第一个结果,提出了一个代码注入技术,这样的设备。以前的工作只成功地注入数据或执行瞬态攻击。注入永久性代码更强大,因为攻击者可以完全控制目标传感器。我们还表明,这种攻击可以用来注入蠕虫,可以通过无线传感器网络传播,并可能创建一个传感器僵尸网络。我们的攻击结合了不同的技术,如面向返回的编程和假堆栈注入。我们提出了实施细节,并提出了一些对策。

英文摘要:

Harvard architecture CPU design is common in the embedded world. Examples of Harvard-based architecture devices are the Mica family of wireless sensors. Mica motes have limited memory and can process only very small packets. Stack-based buffer overflow techniques that inject code into the stack and then execute it are therefore not applicable. It has been a common belief that code injection is impossible on Harvard architectures. This paper presents a remote code injection attack for Mica sensors. We show how to exploit program vulnerabilities to permanently inject any piece of code into the program memory of an Atmel AVR-based sensor. To our knowledge, this is the first result that presents a code injection technique for such devices. Previous work only succeeded in injecting data or performing transient attacks. Injecting permanent code is more powerful since the attacker can gain full control of the target sensor. We also show that this attack can be used to inject a worm that can propagate through the wireless sensor network and possibly create a sensor botnet. Our attack combines different techniques such as return oriented programming and fake stack injection. We present implementation details and suggest some counter-measures.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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