一种安全的设计模式方法来应对侧向注入攻击
A Secure Design Pattern Approach Toward Tackling Lateral-Injection Attacks
摘要:
为对抗性漏洞创建攻击面的软件弱点,例如横向SQL注入(LSQLi)攻击,通常在软件开发的设计阶段引入。安全设计模式有时被用来解决这些弱点。然而,由于侧向攻击的隐蔽性,使用传统的安全模式来解决这些威胁是不够的。因此,我们提出了SEAL,一个安全的设计,推断架构,设计和实现的抽象级别,以代表安全策略对解决LSQLi攻击。我们使用案例研究软件对SEAL进行了评估,在该软件中,我们假设对手的角色,并注入了几个攻击向量,这些攻击向量的任务是破坏其数据库的机密性和完整性。我们对SEAL的评估证明了它解决LSQLi攻击的能力。
英文摘要:
Software weaknesses that create attack surfaces for adversarial exploits, such as lateral SQL injection (LSQLi) attacks, are usually introduced during the design phase of software development. Security design patterns are sometimes applied to tackle these weaknesses. However, due to the stealthy nature of lateral-based attacks, employing traditional security patterns to address these threats is insufficient. Hence, we present SEAL, a secure design that extrapolates architectural, design, and implementation abstraction levels to delegate security strategies toward tackling LSQLi attacks. We evaluated SEAL using case study software, where we assumed the role of an adversary and injected several attack vectors tasked with compromising the confidentiality and integrity of its database. Our evaluation of SEAL demonstrated its capacity to address LSQLi attacks.
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