PINA:针对导航代理的提示注入攻击
PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
AI总结:
PINA提出了一种针对导航代理的提示注入攻击检测框架,通过实验展示了其高攻击成功率和稳健性,揭示了导航代理在安全方面的关键漏洞。
摘要:
由大型语言模型(LLMs)驱动的导航代理能够将自然语言指令转换为可执行的计划和动作。与基于文本的应用程序相比,它们的安全性更加关键:成功的提示注入攻击不仅会改变输出,还可能直接误导物理导航,导致不安全的路线、任务失败或现实中的伤害。尽管这是一个高风险的环境,但导航代理对提示注入的易受攻击性仍然鲜有研究。在本文中,我们提出了PINA,一个专为在黑盒、长上下文和可执行动作约束下的导航代理定制的自适应提示优化框架。在室内和室外导航代理上的实验表明,PINA在平均攻击成功率(ASR)为87.5%的情况下取得了高攻击成功率,超过了所有基线,并在消融和适应性攻击条件下保持稳健。这项工作为提示注入攻击在导航中的系统研究提供了首次探讨,并突显了对具身LLM代理的紧迫安全影响。
英文摘要:
Navigation agents powered by large language models (LLMs) convert natural language instructions into executable plans and actions. Compared to text-based applications, their security is far more critical: a successful prompt injection attack does not just alter outputs but can directly misguide physical navigation, leading to unsafe routes, mission failure, or real-world harm. Despite this high-stakes setting, the vulnerability of navigation agents to prompt injection remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose PINA, an adaptive prompt optimization framework tailored to navigation agents under black-box, long-context, and action-executable constraints. Experiments on indoor and outdoor navigation agents show that PINA achieves high attack success rates with an average ASR of 87.5%, surpasses all baselines, and remains robust under ablation and adaptive-attack conditions. This work provides the first systematic investigation of prompt injection attacks in navigation and highlights their urgent security implications for embodied LLM agents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。