Problems with Probability in Everett's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Casey Blood
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8 pages. The main objections to MWIs have been simplified and clarified in version 3. A more thorough description of other lines of reasoning is given in version 2
In the many-worlds interpretations (MWIs) of Everett and others, if I am the observer, there are several versions of me but no version is singled out as the one corresponding to my perceptions. However, it can be shown that the probability law implies one version must be singled out. Thus MWIs do not provide a sufficient basis for probability. If we are to have an acceptable description of the physical universe, MWIs must be supplemented by some mechanism, such as hidden variables or collapse, that singles out one version of the observer as the perceiving version.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics divides naturally into two parts: first, the interpretation of the structure of the quantum state, in terms of branching, and second, the interpretation of this branching structure in terms of probability. This is the first of two reviews of the Everett interpretation, and focuses on structure, with particular attention to the role of decoherence theory. Written in terms of the quantum histories formalism, decoherence theory just is the theory of branching structure, in Everett's sense.
The existence of probability in the sense of the frequency interpretation, i.e. probability as "long term relative frequency," is shown to follow from the dynamics and the interpretational rules of Everett quantum mechanics in the Heisenberg picture. This proof is free of the difficulties encountered in applying to the Everett interpretation previous results regarding relative frequency and probability in quantum mechanics. The ontology of the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture is also discussed.
An analysis is made of Deutsch's recent claim to have derived the Born rule from decision-theoretic assumptions. It is argued that Deutsch's proof must be understood in the explicit context of the Everett interpretation, and that in this context, it essentially succeeds. Some comments are made about the criticism of Deutsch's proof by Barnum, Caves, Finkelstein, Fuchs, and Schack; it is argued that the flaw which they point out in the proof does not apply if the Everett interpretation is assumed. A longer version of this paper, entitled "Quantum Probability and Decision Theory, Revisted", is a…
This is a manuscript to be published as a book chapter. The text summarizes some of my critics concerning Everett's theory as seen from the perspective of a Bohmian. This is the second draft and comments are still welcome.
Byrne and Hall (1999) criticized the argument of Chalmers (1996) in favor of the Everett-style interpretation. They claimed to show ``the deep and underappreciated flaw in ANY Everett-style interpretation''. I will argue that it is possible to interpret Chalmers's writing in such a way that most of the criticism by Byrne and Hall does not apply. In any case their general criticism of the many-worlds interpretation is unfounded. The recent recognition that the Everett-style interpretations are good (if not the best) interpretations of quantum mechanics has, therefore, not been negated.
Simulations of the observed transition rate (decay rate) versus time for excited-state decay in Everett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics and DeWitt-like extension of Everett's formulation are described. It is shown that Everett's formalism is not general enough to describe excited-state decay, and that tritium lifetime measurements rule out all plausible DeWitt-like extensions. Furthermore, comparison of lifetime measurements and first-principles calculations of excited electronic states of simple atoms limit Everett-like extensions to a small effect for these atoms.
Quantum-mechanical interpretation-related implications of the theory of unitary premeasurement [1] on complete measurement (objectification or collapse included) are investigated in the present article with a view to give an affirmative answer to the question in the title. It is argued that both Bohr's and von Neumann's ideas lead to those of Everett. Hence, the latter can be, in some sense, considered to be a continuation and elaboration of both former approaches. The importance of the idea of relativeness in Everett's theory is emphasized. To free the relative-state theory from its roots bot…
During the last ten years or so, derivations of the Born rule based on decision theory have been proposed and developed, and it is claimed that these are valid in the context of the Everett interpretation. This claim is critically assessed and it is shown that one of its key assumptions, although natural in the context of the Copenhagen interpretation, is not consistent with that of Everett. It is further argued that any interpretation that relates outcome likelihood to the expansion coefficients connecting the wavefunction with the eigenfunctions of the measurement operator must be inconsiste…
Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the measurement exist. This assertion of multiplicity has been understood in many ways by proponents of Everett's theory. Here we shall illustrate how different views on multiplicity carry onto different views on spacetime.
I discuss the meaning of probability in the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, together with the problem of defining histories. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future-tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many-valued and context-dependent logic. In short, probability is degree of truth. These ideas appear to be new (though I expect correction on this), but they are natural and intuitive, and relate to traditional naive ideas of time and chance. Indeed, I argue that Ever…
Having analyzed the formal aspects of Wallace's proof of the Born rule, we now discuss the concepts and axioms upon which it is built. Justification for most axioms is shown to be problematic, and at times contradictory. Some of the problems are caused by ambiguities in the concepts used. We conclude the axioms are not reasonable enough to be taken as mandates of rationality in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. This invalidates the interpretation of Wallace's result as meaning it would be rational for Everettian agents to decide using the Born rule.
We analyze quantum superdense coding as would be seen in Everett's many worlds interpretation of measurement, and compare it to Everettian teleportation.
The Everett-interpretation description of isolated measurements, i.e., measurements involving interaction between a measuring apparatus and a measured system but not interaction with the environment, is shown to be unambiguous, claims in the literature to the contrary notwithstanding. The appearance of ambiguity in such measurements is engendered by the fact that, in the Schroedinger picture, information on splitting into Everett copies must be inferred from the history of the combined system. In the Heisenberg picture this information is contained in mathematical quantities associated with a …
Recently it has been shown that transformations of Heisenberg-picture operators are the causal mechanism which allows Bell-theorem-violating correlations at a distance to coexist with locality in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. A calculation to first order in perturbation theory of the generation of EPRB entanglement in nonrelativistic fermionic field theory in the Heisenberg picture illustrates that the same mechanism leads to correlations without nonlocality in quantum field theory as well. An explicit transformation is given to a representation in which initial-condition in…
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmia…
We observe a Quantum Brownian Motion (QBM) Model Universe in conjunction with recently established Entanglement Relativity and Parallel Occurrence of Decoherence. The Parallel Occurrence of Decoherence establishes the simultaneous occurrence of decoherence for two mutually irreducible structures (decomposition into subsystems) of the total QBM model universe. First we find that Everett world branching for one structure excludes branching for the alternate structure and in order to reconcile this situation branching cannot be allowed for either of the structures considered. Second, we observe t…
The usual interpretational rule of quantum mechanics which states that outcomes do not occur when their weights are zero is changed so as to preclude outcomes with weights less than a small but positive value. With this "positive preclusion" rule, and in the absence of any notion of objective probability, Everett quantum mechanics has the explanatory power to account for the evolution of organisms with subjective expectations of probability that are in accord with the Born rule. Positive preclusion also allows for the derivation of a connection between weight and relative frequency in situatio…
This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular the role played by the concept of `world'. The view presented is that we are entitled to use `many-worlds' terminology even if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an `instant' or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of a preferred foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds …
Stapp claims that, when spatial degrees of freedom are taken into account, Everett quantum mechanics is ambiguous due to a "core basis problem." To examine an aspect of this claim I generalize the ideal measurement model to include translational degrees of freedom for both the measured system and the measuring apparatus. Analysis of this generalized model using the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture shows that it makes unambiguous predictions for the possible results of measurements and their respective probabilities. The presence of translational degrees of freedom for the measu…
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can't make sense of probability at all, or it can't explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has developed and defended Deutsch's …
Everett's Relative State Interpretation (aka Many Worlds Interpretation) has gained increasing interest due to the progress understanding the role of decoherence. In order to fulfill its promise as an intellectually economic realistic description of the physical world, two postulates are formulated. In short they are 1) for a system with continuous coordinates $\mathbf x$, discrete variable $j$, and state $ψ_j(\mathbf x)$, the density $ρ_j(x)=|ψ_j(x)|^2$ gives the distribution of the location of the system with the respect to the variables $x$ and $j$; 2) an equation of motion for the state $i…
We analyze the objective meaning of probabilities in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of Everett. For this purpose we study in details the weak law of large numbers and the role of typicality and universally negligible probabilities (through the works of Cournot and Borel). We demonstrate that Everett's theory doesn't provide any clue for fixing a probability rule and therefore contradicts irrevocably empirical facts and Born's law.
Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the measurement exist. This notion of multiplicity has been understood in different ways by proponents of Everett's theory. In fact the spectrum of opinions on various ontological questions raised by Everett's approach is rather large, as we attempt to document in this critica…
I show how the quantum paradoxes occurring when we adopt a standard realist framework (or a framework in which the collapse implies a physical change of the state of the system) vanish if we abandon the idea that a measurement is related (directly or indirectly) to a physical change of state. In Convivial Solipsism, similarly to Everett interpretation, there is no collapse of the wave function. But contrary to Everett interpretation, there is only one world. This allows also to get rid of any non-locality and to provide a solution to the Wigner friend problem and its more recent versions.
Our objective is to demonstrate an inconsistency with both the original and modern Everettian Many Worlds Interpretations. We do this by examining two important corollaries of the universally valid quantum mechanics in the context of the Quantum Brownian Motion (QBM) model: "Entanglement Relativity" and the "parallel occurrence of decoherence." We conclude that the highlighted inconsistency demands that either there is a privileged spatial structure of the QBM model universe or that the Everettian Worlds are not physically real.
The quantum theory of de Broglie and Bohm solves the measurement problem, but the hypothetical corpuscles play no role in the argument. The solution finds a more natural home in the Everett interpretation.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics divides naturally into two parts: first, the interpretation of the structure of the quantum state, in terms of branching, and second, the interpretation of this branching structure in terms of probability. This is the second of two reviews of the Everett interpretation, and focuses on probability. Branching processes are identified as chance processes, and the squares of branch amplitudes are chances. Since branching is emergent, physical probability is emergent as well.
Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenbe…
In this brief note, we argue that contrarily to what is still often stated, the Everett many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is not in principle impossible to test. It is actually not more difficult (but not easier either) to test than most other kinds of multiverse theories. We also remind why multiverse scenarios can be falsified.
The role attributed to the observer in various interpretations of quantum mechanics as well as in classical statistical mechanics is discussed, with particular attention being paid to the Everett interpretation. In this context, the important difference between "quasi-classical" (robust against decoherence) and "macroscopically given" (rather than being part of a thermodynamic ensemble) is pointed out.
It is generally accepted that Everett's theory of quantum mechanics cannot be experimentally tested as such experiment would involve operations on the observer which are beyond our current technology. We propose an alternative to test Everett's theory which does not involve any operation on the observer. If we assume that the observer is of finite dimension, it is shown that Everett's theory leads to distinctive properties for the system being observed, and that such difference can be experimentally tested.
The fact that certain "extraordinary" probabilistic phenomena--in particular, macroscopic violations of the second law of thermodynamics--have never been observed to occur can be accounted for by taking hard preclusion as a basic physical law; i.e. precluding from existence events corresponding to very small but nonzero values of quantum-mechanical weight. This approach is not consistent with the usual ontology of the Everett interpretation, in which outcomes correspond to branches of the state vector, but can be successfully implemented using a Heisenberg-picture-based ontology in which outco…
Excited state decay is examined within the framework of strictly Everett-like (SEL) formulations of quantum mechanics. Even though these formulations were developed for systems of particles as part of a larger system that includes a measurement apparatus, the analysis is carried out in terms of isolated particles because excited state decay measurements are performed under conditions that approximate isolation. It is shown that the time evolution of the wave function describing each particle in a sample of well-isolated identical particles in their lowest excited state must satisfy the same br…
A "geometric" intepretation of probability is proposed, modelled on the treatment of tense in 4-dimensional spacetime. It is applied to Everett's approach to quantum mechanics, as formulated in terms of consistent histories. Standard objections to Everett's approach, based on the difficulties of interpreting probability in its terms, are considered in detail, but found to be wanting.
The present paper shows how one might model Everettian quantum mechanics using hyperfinitely many worlds. A hyperfinite model allows one to consider idealized measurements of observables with continuous-valued spectra where different outcomes are associated with possibly infinitesimal probabilities. One can also prove hyperfinite formulations of Everett's limiting relative-frequency and randomness properties, theorems he considered central to his formulation of quantum mechanics. This approach also provides a more general framework in which to consider no-collapse formulations of quantum mecha…
Conceptual problems in quantum mechanics result from the specific quantum concept of reality and require, for their solution, including the observer's consciousness into quantum theory of measurements. Most naturally this is achieved in the framework of Everett's "many-worlds interpretation" of quantum mechanics. According to this interpretation, various classical alternatives are perceived by consciousness separately from each other. In the Extended Everett Concept (EEC) proposed by the present author, the separation of the alternatives is identified with the phenomenon of consciousness. This…
To solve the probability problem of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, D.Wallace has presented a formal proof of the Born rule via decision theory, as proposed by D.Deutsch. The idea is to get subjective probabilities from rational decisions related to quantum measurements, showing the non-probabilistic parts of the quantum formalism, plus some rational constraints, ensure the squared modulus of quantum amplitudes play the role of such probabilities. We provide a new presentation of Wallace's proof, reorganized to simplify some arguments, and analyze it from a formal perspect…
About ten years ago, Itamar Pitowsky and I wrote a paper, 'Two dogmas about quantum mechanics,' in which we outlined an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. Here I revisit the paper and, following Frauchiger and Renner, I show that the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions in 'Wigner's-Friend'-type scenarios that involve 'encapsulated' measurements, where a super-observer (which could be a quantum automaton), with unrestricted ability to measure any arbitrary observable of a complex quantum system, measures th…
Proponents of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Theory have made efforts to show that to an observer in a branch, everything happens as if the projection postulate were true without postulating it. In this paper, we will indicate that it is only possible to deduce this rule if one introduces another postulate that is logically equivalent to introducing the projection postulate as an extra assumption. We do this by examining the consequences of changing the projection postulate into an alternative one, while keeping the unitary part of quantum theory, and indicate that this is a consistent …
`Shallow' and `deep' versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum modal realism. After presenting what is involved in s…
We discuss the role that intuitive theories of physics play in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We compare and contrast naïve physics with quantum mechanics and argue that quantum mechanics is not just hard to understand but that it is difficult to believe, often appearing magical in nature. Quantum mechanics is often discussed in the context of "quantum weirdness" and quantum entanglement is known as "spooky action at a distance." This spookiness is more than just because quantum mechanics doesn't match everyday experience; it ruffles the feathers of our naïve physics cognitive module…
Proposed derivations of the Born rule for Everettian theory are controversial. I argue that they are unnecessary but may provide justification for a simplified version of the Principal Principle. It's also unnecessary to replace Everett's idea that a subject splits in measurement contexts with the idea that subjects have linear histories which partition: Deutsch 1985, 2011; Saunders and Wallace 2008; Saunders 2010; Wallace 2012, Chapter 7; Wilson 2013, forthcoming. Linear histories were introduced to provide a concept of pre-measurement uncertainty and I explain why pre-measurement uncertainty…
Everett's relative states interpretation of quantum mechanics has met with problems related to probability, the preferred basis, and multiplicity. The third theme, I argue, is the most important one. It has led to developments of the original approach into many-worlds, many-minds, and decoherence-based approaches. The latter especially have been advocated in recent years, in an effort to understand multiplicity without resorting to what is often perceived as extravagant constructions. Drawing from and adding to arguments of others, I show that proponents of decoherence-based approaches have no…
Quantum gravity may have as much to tell us about the foundations and interpretation of quantum mechanics as it does about gravity. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and Everett's Relative State Formulation are complementary descriptions which in a sense are dual to one another. My purpose here is to discuss this duality in the light of the of ER=EPR conjecture.
The notion of objective probability or chance, as a physical trait of the world, has proved elusive; the identification of chances with actual frequencies does not succeed. An adequate theory of chance should explain not only the connection of chance with statistics, but with degrees of belief, and more broadly the entire phenomenology of (seemingly) chance events and their measurement. Branching structure in the decoherence-based many worlds theory provides an account of what chance is that satisfies all these desiderata, including the requirement that chance involves uncertainty.
An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch's own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason's Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from `probability'. Some consequences of (Everettian) quantum mechanics for decision theory itself are also discussed.
A defence is offered of a version of the branch-counting rule for probability in the Everett interpretation (otherwise known as many-worlds interpretation) of quantum mechanics that both depends on the state and is continuous in the norm topology on Hilbert space. The well-known branch-counting rule, for realistic models of measurements, in which branches are defined by decoherence theory, fails this test. The new rule hinges on the use of decoherence theory in defining branching structure, and specifically decoherent histories theory. On this basis ratios of branch numbers are defined, free o…
We modify the Relative State Interpretation (RSI) of Quantum Mechanics so that it does not imply many worlds and parallel realities. We drop the assumption that probability amplitudes correspond one-to-one with reality: Not all information is contained in amplitudes, and not all amplitudes need be realized. Amplitudes do not "collapse" after a measurement, but evolve continuously, including unrealized ones. After each "event" only one possible outcome is realized. Therefore, if a value is measured, that value is real, all others are not; there is only one reality and one world. Reality content…
