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arXiv 0707.3462cs.GTmath.OC
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可分低秩连续对策

Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games

Noah D. Stein, Asuman Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parrilo

摘要:

在本文中,我们研究非零和可分博弈,这是连续的游戏,其支付采取的产品和的形式。这个子类包括所有有限游戏和多项式游戏。我们研究了可分博弈的均衡结构。我们表明,这些游戏承认支持的纳什均衡。激励的边界上的支持的混合均衡在两个玩家有限的游戏中的支付矩阵的秩,我们定义的概念的秩的n-玩家连续的游戏,并使用此提供的基数上的界限的支持的均衡策略。我们提出了一个一般的特征定理,指出一个连续的游戏有有限的秩当且仅当它是可分的。利用我们的秩的结果,我们提出了一个有效的算法来计算近似平衡的两个球员可分离的游戏与固定的策略空间在时间多项式的游戏的秩。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in separable games. We show that these games admit finitely supported Nash equilibria. Motivated by the bounds on the supports of mixed equilibria in two-player finite games in terms of the ranks of the payoff matrices, we define the notion of the rank of an n-player continuous game and use this to provide bounds on the cardinality of the support of equilibrium strategies. We present a general characterization theorem that states that a continuous game has finite rank if and only if it is separable. Using our rank results, we present an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria of two-player separable games with fixed strategy spaces in time polynomial in the rank of the game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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