Ariel Caticha
We review the Consistent Amplitude approach to Quantum Theory and argue that quantum probabilities are explicitly Bayesian. In this approach amplitudes are tools for inference. They codify objective information about how complicated experimental setups are put together from simpler ones. Thus, probabilities may be partially subjective but the amplitudes are not.
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In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. In this paper we show that, despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing defin…
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics, and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probab…
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix.
In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms…
In the Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory (or QBism), the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but…
The ABL rule is derived as a tool of standard quantum mechanics. The ontological significance of the existence of objective probabilities is discussed. Objections by Kastner and others to counterfactual uses of the ABL rule are refuted. Metaphysical presumptions leading to such views as Kastner is defending in her Comment are examined and shown to be unwarranted.
The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984] reflection principle (which entails a related constraint poin…
The problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is reanalyzed within a general, strictly probabilistic framework (without reduction postulate). Based on a novel comprehensive definition of measurement the natural emergence of objective events is demonstrated and their formal representation within quantum mechanics is obtained. In order to be objective an event is required to be observable or readable in at least two independent, mutually non-interfering ways with necessarily agreeing results. Consistency in spite of unrestricted validity of reversibility of the evolution or the superposition p…
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities, and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference, what stat…
Quantum Bayesian inference with Suport vector states for intrusion detection
本文提出一种基于显式量子电路和状态向量模拟的量子贝叶斯推理方法，通过酉门编码概率并经符号化后选择提取后验分布，在入侵检测场景中验证了其可行性与可解释性。
We begin with a review of a well known class of networks, Classical Bayesian (CB) nets (also called causal probabilistic nets by some). Given a situation which includes randomness, CB nets are used to calculate the probabilities of various hypotheses about the situation, conditioned on the available evidence. We introduce a new class of networks, which we call Quantum Bayesian (QB) nets, that generalize CB nets to the quantum mechanical regime. We explain how to use QB nets to calculate quantum mechanical conditional probabilities (in case of either sharp or fuzzy observations), and discuss th…
We derive an analogue of the quantum total probability rule by constructing a probability theory based on paraconsistent logic. Bayesian probability theory is constructed upon classical logic and a desiderata, that is, a set of desired properties that the theory must obey. We construct a new probability theory following the desiderata of Bayesian probability theory but replacing the classical logic by paraconsistent logic. This class of logic has been conceived to handle eventual inconsistencies or contradictions among logical propositions without leading to the trivialisation of the theory. W…
How can probabilities make sense in a deterministic many-worlds theory? We address two facets of this problem: why should rational agents assign subjective probabilities to branching events, and why should branching events happen with relative frequencies matching their objective probabilities. To address the first question, we generalise the Deutsch-Wallace theorem to a wide class of many-world theories, and show that the subjective probabilities are given by a norm that depends on the dynamics of the theory: the 2-norm in the usual Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the 1-n…
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only ar…
In the quantum-Bayesian approach to quantum foundations, a quantum state is viewed as an expression of an agent's personalist Bayesian degrees of belief, or probabilities, concerning the results of measurements. These probabilities obey the usual probability rules as required by Dutch-book coherence, but quantum mechanics imposes additional constraints upon them. In this paper, we explore the question of deriving the structure of quantum-state space from a set of assumptions in the spirit of quantum Bayesianism. The starting point is the representation of quantum states induced by a symmetric …
In this paper we provide a simple random-variable example of inconsistent information, and analyze it using three different approaches: Bayesian, quantum-like, and negative probabilities. We then show that, at least for this particular example, both the Bayesian and the quantum-like approaches have less normative power than the negative probabilities one.
Algorithmic probability has shown some promise in dealing with the probability problem in the Everett interpretation, since it provides an objective, single-case probability measure. Many find the Everettian cosmology to be overly extravagant, however, and algorithmic probability has also provided improved models of subjective probability and Bayesian reasoning. I attempt here to generalize algorithmic Everettianism to more Bayesian and subjectivist interpretations. I present a general framework for applying generative probability, of which algorithmic probability can be considered a special c…
Quantum Probabilities Are Objective Degrees of Epistemic Justification
本文针对QBism将量子概率完全主观化而难以容纳科学客观性的问题，提出一种继承其优点的解释，主张量子概率是认知辩护的客观程度。
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