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arXiv math/0406509math.PRmath.CO
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加权多数的Law of Large Numbers

A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority

Olle Haggstrom, Gil Kalai, Elchanan Mossel

摘要:

考虑两个候选人之间的选举,其中选民的选择是随机和独立的,选民选择第一个候选人的概率是$p>1/2$。孔多塞的陪审团定理,他来自弱大数定律断言,如果选民人数趋于无穷大的概率,第一个候选人将当选趋于一。投票人或其投票权的影响力的概念与弱大数定律在比简单多数更一般的投票规则中的推广有关。在本文中,我们指出了两种不同的方式来扩展的经典概念的投票权和影响的任意概率分布。与我们相关的扩展是选民的“效果”,这是选民投票和选举结果之间相关性的加权版本。我们证明了一个扩展的弱大数定律的加权多数博弈时,所有的个人的影响都很小,并表明这一结果不适用于任何投票规则,这是不是基于加权多数。

英文摘要:

Consider an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is $p>1/2$. Condorcet's Jury Theorem which he derived from the weak law of large numbers asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. The notion of influence of a voter or its voting power is relevant for extensions of the weak law of large numbers for voting rules which are more general than simple majority. In this paper we point out two different ways to extend the classical notions of voting power and influences to arbitrary probability distributions. The extension relevant to us is the ``effect'' of a voter, which is a weighted version of the correlation between the voter's vote and the election's outcomes. We prove an extension of the weak law of large numbers to weighted majority games when all individual effects are small and show that this result does not apply to any voting rule which is not based on weighted majority.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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