Quantified propositional intuitionistic logic is obtained from propositional intuitionistic logic by adding quantifiers \forall p, \exists p over propositions. In the context of Kripke semantics, a proposition is a subset of the worlds in a model structure which is upward closed. Kremer (1997) has shown that the quantified propositional intuitionistic logic Hπ+ based on the class of all partial orders is recursively isomorphic to full second-order logic. He raised the question of whether the logic resulting from restriction to trees is axiomatizable. It is shown that it is, in fact, decidable. The methods used can also be used to establish the decidability of modal S4 with propositional quantification on similar types of Kripke structures.
We find a translation with particularly nice properties from intuitionistic propositional logic in countably many variables to intuitionistic propositional logic in two variables. In addition, the existence of a possibly-not-as-nice translation from any countable logic into intuitionistic propositional logic in two variables is shown. The nonexistence of a translation from classical logic into intuitionistic propositional logic which preserves ``and'' and ``or'' but not necessarily ``true'' is proven. These results about translations follow from additional results about embeddings into free He…
It is shown that propositional intuitionistic logic is the maximal (with respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain topological property reminiscent of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under asimulations.
It is known that the set of tautologies of second order intuitionistic propositional logic, $\mathrm{IPC} 2$, is undecidable. Here, we prove that the sets of formulas of $\mathrm{IPC} 2$ which are true in the algebra of open subsets of reals or rationals are decidable.
Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard translation of a…
In the style of Lindström's theorem for classical first-order logic, this article characterizes propositional bi-intuitionistic logic as the maximal (with respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain form of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under bi-asimulations. Since bi-intuitionistic logic introduces new complexities in the intuitionistic setting by adding the analogue of a backwards looking modality, the present paper constitutes a non-trivial modification of previous work done by the authors for intuitionistic logic in: G. Badia and G. Olkhovikov…
Both propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic are expressively complete. As a consequence, every formula with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula in the language of propositional dependence logic without these two connectives. We show that although such a (non-compositional) translation exists, neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in propositional dependence logic.
We show that intuitionistic propositional logic is \emph{Carnap categorical}: the only interpretation of the connectives consistent with the intuitionistic consequence relation is the standard interpretation. This holds relative to the most well-known semantics with respect to which intuitionistic logic is sound and complete; among them Kripke semantics, Beth semantics, Dragalin semantics, and topological semantics. It also holds for algebraic semantics, although categoricity in that case is different in kind from categoricity relative to possible worlds style semantics.
We improve the answer to the question: what set of excluded middles for propositional variables in a formula suffices to prove the formula in intuitionistic propositional logic whenever it is provable in classical propositional logic.
Intuitionistic logic extended with decidable propositional atoms combines classical properties in its propositional part and intuitionistic properties for derivable formulas not containing propositional symbols. Sequent calculus is used as a framework for investigating this extension. Admissibility of cut is retained. Constrained Kripke structures are introduced for modeling intuitionistic logic with decidable propositional atoms. The extent of the disjunction and existence properties is investigated. The latest information about this research can be found at http://sakharov.net/median.html
We prove that the propositional logic of intuitionistic set theory IZF is intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. More generally, we show that IZF has the de Jongh property with respect to every intermediate logic that is complete with respect to a class of finite trees. The same results follow for CZF.
We extend the polynomial time algorithms due to Buss and Mints(APAL 1999) and Ferrari, Fiorentini and Fiorino(LPAR 2002) to yield a polynomial time complete disjunction property in intuitionistic propositional logic.
In this paper, we consider the complexity of propositional proofs of classical and intuitionistic tautologies. In fact, we describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time decision procedure for intuitionistic implicational tautologies. For this purpose, we reduce a decision problem for intuitionistic implicational tautologies to a decision problem for deductive proof diagrams which are a short form for representing of proofs in the intuitionistic implicational calculus. Next, we transform deductive proof diagrams to a special form in which any proof has the size bounded by a polynomial in the leng…
We prove that the first-order logic of CZF is intuitionistic first-order logic. To do so, we introduce a new model of transfinite computation (Set Register Machines) and combine the resulting notion of realisability with Beth semantics. On the way, we also show that the propositional admissible rules of CZF are exactly those of intuitionistic propositional logic.
We introduce a realisability semantics for infinitary intuitionistic set theory that is based on Ordinal Turing Machines (OTMs). We show that our notion of OTM-realisability is sound with respect to certain systems of infinitary intuitionistic logic, and that all axioms of infinitary Kripke-Platek set theory are realised. Finally, we use a variant of our notion of realisability to show that the propositional admissible rules of (finitary) intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory are exactly the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic.
In this paper, we present a propositional logic (called mixed logic) containing disjoint copies of minimal, intuitionistic and classical logics. We prove a completeness theorem for this logic with respect to a Kripke semantics. We establish some relations between mixed logic and minimal, intuitionistic and classical logics. We present at the end a sequent calculus version for this logic.
In 1936, Stanislaw Jaśkowski gave a construction of an interesting sequence of what he called "matrices", which we would today call "finite Heyting Algebras". He then gave a very brief sketch of a proof that if a propositional formula holds in each of these algebras then it is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). The sketch just describes a certain normal form for propositional formulas and gives a very terse outline of an inductive argument showing that an unprovable formula in the normal form can be refuted in one of the algebras. Unfortunately, it is far from clear how to r…
We prove that there is a factor of the Muchnik lattice that captures intuitionistic propositional logic. This complements a now classic result of Skvortsova for the Medvedev lattice.
The inverse method is a saturation based theorem proving technique; it relies on a forward proof-search strategy and can be applied to cut-free calculi enjoying the subformula property. Here we apply this method to derive the unprovability of a goal formula G in Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. To this aim we design a forward calculus FRJ(G) for Intuitionistic unprovability which is prone to constructively ascertain the unprovability of a formula G by providing a concise countermodel for it; in particular we prove that the generated countermodels have minimal height. Moreover, we clarify th…
Following G. Mints(Kluwer 2000 and draft 2013), we present terminating and bicomplete proof searches in multi-succedent sequent calculi for intuitionistic propositional logic, fragments of intuitionistic predicate logic and full intuitionistic predicate logic in the spirit of Schuette's schema.
A famous result, conjectured by Gödel in 1932 and proved by McKinsey and Tarski in 1948, says that $φ$ is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional logic IPC iff its Gödel-translation $φ'$ is a theorem of modal logic S4. In this paper, we extend an intuitionistic version of modal logic S1+SP, introduced in our previous paper (S. Lewitzka, Algebraic semantics for a modal logic close to S1, J. Logic and Comp., doi:10.1093/logcom/exu067) to a classical modal logic L and prove the following: a propositional formula $φ$ is a theorem of IPC iff $\squareφ$ is a theorem of L (actually, we show: $Φ\vda…
This paper presents a soundness and completeness proof for propositional intuitionistic calculus with respect to the semantics of computability logic. The latter interprets formulas as interactive computational problems, formalized as games between a machine and its environment. Intuitionistic implication is understood as algorithmic reduction in the weakest possible -- and hence most natural -- sense, disjunction and conjunction as deterministic-choice combinations of problems (disjunction = machine's choice, conjunction = environment's choice), and "absurd" as a computational problem of univ…
We extend the main result of (G. Badia and G. Olkhovikov. A Lindström theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 61 (1): 11--30 (2020)) to the first-order intuitionistic logic (with and without equality), showing that it is the maximal (with respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain form of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under asimulations. A similar result is also shown for the intuitionistic logic of constant domains.
In this article we develop a new version of the intuitionist existential graphs presented by Arnol Oostra [4]. The deductive rules presented in this article have the same meaning as those described in the work of Yuri Poveda [5], because the deductions according to the parity of the cuts are eliminated and are replaced by a finite set of recursive rules. This way, $ Alfa_I $ the existential graphs system for intuitional propositional logic follows the course of the deductive rules of the system $ Alfa_0 $ described by Poveda [5], and is equivalent to the intuitionistic propositional calculus. …
It is a consequence of existing literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras-that is, the alge- braic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus-always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC. Consequently, the $μ$-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every $μ$-formula being equiv- alent to a fixed-point free formula. We give in this paper an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm…
We prove that the sequent calculus $\mathsf{L_{RBL}}$ for residuated basic logic $\mathsf{RBL}$ has strong finite model property, and that intuitionistic logic can be embedded into basic propositional logic $\mathsf{BPL}$. Thus $\mathsf{RBL}$ is decidable. Moreover, it follows that the class of residuated basic algebras has the finite embeddability property, and that $\mathsf{BPL}$ is PSPACE-complete, and that intuitionistic logic can be embedded into the modal logic $\mathsf{K4}$.
In 1933, Gödel introduced a provability interpretation of the propositional intuitionistic logic to establish a formalization for the BHK interpretation. He used the modal system, $\mathbf{S4}$, as a formalization of the intuitive concept of provability and then translated $\mathbf{IPC}$ to $\mathbf{S4}$. His work suggested the problem to find a concrete provability interpretation of the modal logic $\mathbf{S4}$. In this paper, we will try to answer this problem. In fact, we will generalize Solovay's provability interpretation of the modal logic $\mathbf{GL}$ to capture other modal logics suc…
Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is the paradigm of semantics in which meaning in logic is based on proof (as opposed to truth). A particular instance of P-tS for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) is its base-extension semantics (B-eS). This semantics is given by a relation called support, explaining the meaning of the logical constants, which is parameterized by systems of rules called bases that provide the semantics of atomic propositions. In this paper, we interpret bases as collections of definite formulae and use the operational view of the latter as provided by uniform proof-sear…
In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hajek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk's variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as non-total non-functional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson's R (with arithmetic operations also interp…
It is known that intuitionistic Kripke semantics can be generalized so that it can treat arbitrary propositional connectives characterized by truth functions. We extend this generalized Kripke semantics to first-order logic, and study how the choice of connectives changes the relation between intuitionistic predicate logic and the logic of constant domains in terms of validity of sequents. Our main result gives a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the set of valid sequents in intuitionistic predicate logic to coincide with the set of valid sequents in the logic of constant domains.
It is a consequence of existing literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras-that is, the algebraic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus-always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC. Consequently, the $μ$-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every $μ$-formula being equivalent to a fixed-point free formula. We give in this paper an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm to …
Intuitionistic belief has been axiomatized by Artemov and Protopopescu as an extension of intuitionistic propositional logic by means of the distributivity scheme K, and of co-reflection $A\rightarrow\Box A$. This way, belief is interpreted as a result of verification, and it fits an extended Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation for intuitionistic propositional logic with an epistemic modality. In the present paper, structural properties of a natural deduction system $\mathsf{IEL}^{-}$ for intuitionistic belief are investigated. The focus is on the analyticity of the calculus, so that the…
Intuitionism and computing with partial information
Sofia University（索非亚大学）；University of Leeds（利兹大学）；University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；Università Degli Studi di Siena（锡耶纳大学）；University of Wisconsin Madison（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校）
We investigate properties of monadic purely negational fragment of Intuitionistic Control Logic (ICL). This logic arises from Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPL) by extending language of IPL by additional new constant for falsum. Having two different falsum constants enables to define two forms of negation. We analyse implicational relations between negational monadic formulae and present a poset of non equivalent formulae of this fragment of ICL.
In this paper, we study logics of dependence on the propositional level. We prove that several interesting propositional logics of dependence, including propositional dependence logic, propositional intuitionistic dependence logic as well as propositional inquisitive logic, are expressively complete and have disjunctive or conjunctive normal forms. We provide deduction systems and prove the completeness theorems for these logics.
For a given intuitionistic propositional formula A and a propositional variable x occurring in it, define the infinite sequence of formulae { A \_i | i$\ge$1} by letting A\_1 be A and A\_{i+1} be A(A\_i/x). Ruitenburg's Theorem [8] says that the sequence { A \_i } (modulo logical equivalence) is ultimately periodic with period 2, i.e. there is N $\ge$ 0 such that A N+2 $\leftrightarrow$ A N is provable in intuitionistic propositional calculus. We give a semantic proof of this theorem, using duality techniques and bounded bisimulations ranks.
This report first shows the equivalence bewteen several formulations of classical logic in intuitionistic logic (tertium non datur, reductio ad absurdum, Pierce's law). Then it establishes the correctness of the Gödel-Kolmogorov translation, whose restriction to the propositional case is due to Glivenko. This translation maps a formula $F$ of first order logic to a formula $F^{\lnot\lnot}$ in such a way that $F$ is provable in classical logic if and only if $F^{\lnot\lnot}$ is provable in intuitionistic logic. All formal proofs are presented in natural deduction. These questions are well-known…
In our previous work, we proposed the logic obtained from full non-associative Lambek calculus by adding a sort of linear-logical modality. We call this logic non-associative non-commutative intuitionistic linear logic ($\mathbf{NACILL}$, for short). In this paper, we establish the decidability and undecidability results for various extensions of $\mathbf{NACILL}$. Regarding the decidability results, we show that the deducibility problems for several extensions of $\mathbf{NACILL}$ with the rule of left-weakening are decidable. Regarding the undecidability results, we show that the provability…
Following A. Kuznetsov's outline, we restore Kuznetsov's syntactic proof of the assertoric equipollence of the intuitionistic propositional calculus and the proof-intuitionistic calculus KM (Kuznetsov's Theorem). Then, we show that this property is true for a broad class of modal logics on an intuitionistic basis, which includes, e.g., the modalized Heyting calculus mHC. The last fact is one of two key properties necessary for the commutativity of a diagram involving the lattices of normal extensions of four well-known logics. Also, we give an algebraic interpretation of the assertoric equipol…
This paper introduces two sequent calculi for intuitionistic strong Löb logic ${\sf iSL}_\Box$: a terminating sequent calculus ${\sf G4iSL}_\Box$ based on the terminating sequent calculus ${\sf G4ip}$ for intuitionistic propositional logic ${\sf IPC}$ and an extension ${\sf G3iSL}_\Box$ of the standard cut-free sequent calculus ${\sf G3ip}$ without structural rules for ${\sf IPC}$. One of the main results is a syntactic proof of the cut-elimination theorem for ${\sf G3iSL}_\Box$. In addition, equivalences between the sequent calculi and Hilbert systems for ${\sf iSL}_\Box$ are established. It …
In this paper, we present a propositional sequent calculus containing disjoint copies of classical and intuitionistic logics. We prove a cut-elimination theorem and we establish a relation between this system and linear logic.
Propositional logics in general, considered as a set of sentences, can be undecidable even if they have "nice" representations, e.g., are given by a calculus. Even decidable propositional logics can be computationally complex (e.g., already intuitionistic logic is PSPACE-complete). On the other hand, finite-valued logics are computationally relatively simple - at worst NP. Moreover, finite-valued semantics are simple, and general methods for theorem proving exist. This raises the question to what extent and under what circumstances propositional logics represented in various ways can be approx…
Takeuti and Titani have introduced and investigated a logic they called intuitionistic fuzzy logic. This logic is characterized as the first-order Goedel logic based on the truth value set [0,1]. The logic is known to be axiomatizable, but no deduction system amenable to proof-theoretic, and hence, computational treatment, has been known. Such a system is presented here, based on previous work on hypersequent calculi for propositional Goedel logics by Avron. It is shown that the system is sound and complete, and allows cut-elimination. A question by Takano regarding the eliminability of the Ta…
