通过免费样本在数据市场中进行信号传递
Signaling in Data Markets via Free Samples
AI总结:
本文研究了数据市场中通过免费样本进行信号传递的机制,分析了多阶段游戏中卖家的信号策略和买家的采购拍卖机制。
摘要:
我们研究了一种设定,其中数据买家通过从K个数据卖家中购买样本来估计一个未知参数。每个卖家都有私有已知的数据质量(例如高 vs. 低方差)和私有的每样本成本。我们考虑一个多阶段游戏,在第一阶段是免费试用阶段,卖家可以选择通过提供少量免费样本来信号数据质量。买家根据免费数据的方差更新他们的信念,然后在第二阶段运行采购拍卖来购买数据。在拍卖阶段,我们刻画了一个近似最优的贝叶斯激励相容机制:买家通过最小化信念调整的虚拟成本选择一个单一卖家,并将购买的样本数量作为后验质量和虚拟成本的函数。在免费试用阶段,我们刻画了均衡,将上述机制作为延续游戏。免费试用可能无法出现:对于某些参数,所有卖家揭示零样本。然而,在足够强的竞争(大K)下,存在一个均衡,其中卖家揭示最大允许的样本数量;事实上,这是唯一的均衡。
英文摘要:
We study a setting in which a data buyer seeks to estimate an unknown parameter by purchasing samples from one of K data sellers. Each seller has privately known data quality (e.g., high vs. low variance) and a private per-sample cost. We consider a multi-stage game in which the first stage is a free-trial stage in which the sellers have the option of signaling data quality by offering a few samples of data for free. Buyers update their beliefs based on the sample variance of the free data and then run a procurement auction to buy data in a second stage. For the auction stage, we characterize an approximately optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism: the buyer selects a single seller by minimizing a belief-adjusted virtual cost and chooses the purchased sample size as a function of posterior quality and virtual cost. For the free-trial stage, we characterize the equilibrium, taking the above mechanism as the continuation game. Free trials may fail to emerge: for some parameters, all sellers reveal zero samples. However, under sufficiently strong competition (large K), there is an equilibrium in which sellers reveal the maximum allowable number of samples; in fact, it is the unique equilibrium.
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