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arXiv 2009.09336cs.GT
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双边市场中的几乎无嫉妒重复匹配

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets

Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Benjamin Plaut

摘要:

双边市场由两组代理商组成,每个代理商都有相对于另一个代理商的偏好(Airbnb,Upwork,Lyft,Uber等)。我们提出并分析了一个重复匹配问题,其中一些匹配发生在每个时间步,我们的目标是确保公平的累积分配在无限的时间范围。我们的主要结果是一个多项式时间算法的加法,对称(v_i(j)= v_j(i)),和二进制(v_i(j)\in \{a,1\})赋值,既(1)保证“envy-freeness到一个单一的匹配”(EF 1)和(2)选择一个最大的重量匹配在每个时间步。因此,对于这类估值,可以在不牺牲经济效率的情况下实现公平。这一结果甚至适用于“动态估值”,即,估值会随着时间而变化。虽然对称性是一个强有力的假设,我们表明,这一结果不能扩展到不对称的二元估值:(1)和(2)一起是不可能的,即使当估值不随时间变化,和动态估值,甚至(1)单独是不可能的。据我们所知,这是第一次在重复匹配设置中分析无嫉妒。

英文摘要:

A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and our goal is to ensure fairness with respect to the cumulative allocations over an infinite time horizon. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for additive, symmetric (v_i(j) = v_j(i)), and binary (v_i(j) \in \{a,1\}) valuations that both (1) guarantees "envy-freeness up to a single match" (EF1) and (2) selects a maximum weight matching on each time step. Thus for this class of valuations, fairness can be achieved without sacrificing economic efficiency. This result holds even for "dynamic valuations", i.e., valuations that change over time. Although symmetry is a strong assumption, we show that this result cannot be extended to asymmetric binary valuations: (1) and (2) together are impossible even when valuations do not change over time, and for dynamic valuations, even (1) alone is impossible. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of envy-freeness in a repeated matching setting.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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