A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and our goal is to ensure fairness with respect to the cumulative allocations over an infinite time horizon. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for additive, symmetric (v_i(j) = v_j(i)), and binary (v_i(j) \in \{a,1\}) valuations that both (1) guarantees "envy-freeness up to a single match" (EF1) and (2) selects a maximum weight matching on each time step. Thus for this class of valuations, fairness can be achieved without sacrificing economic efficiency. This result holds even for "dynamic valuations", i.e., valuations that change over time. Although symmetry is a strong assumption, we show that this result cannot be extended to asymmetric binary valuations: (1) and (2) together are impossible even when valuations do not change over time, and for dynamic valuations, even (1) alone is impossible. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of envy-freeness in a repeated matching setting.
Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy
MIT(麻省理工学院);Microsoft Research(微软研究院)
最近的一系列工作提供了简单组合拍卖形式的福利保证,例如通过同时第二价格拍卖(SiSPA)出售m件物品(Christodoulou et al. 2008,Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011,Feldman et al. 2013)。即使拍卖被重复执行,而且玩家使用无遗憾学习算法,这些保证也是有效的。不幸的是,现成的无遗憾算法,这些拍卖是计算效率低下的行动的数量是指数。我们表明,这个障碍是不可逾越的:有没有多项式时间的无遗憾算法SiSPAs,除非RP $\supseteq$ NP,即使投标人是单位需求。我们的下限提出了一个问题,如何好的结果多项式有界的投标人可能会发现在这样的拍卖。为了回答这个问题,我们提出了一个新的概念,学习拍卖,称为“无嫉妒学习。“这个概念是建立在瓦尔拉斯均衡的基础上,我们证明了它既可以有效地实现,又可以产生近似最优的福利,即使投标人有分数次加性(XOS)估值(假设需求预言)或覆盖估值(没有需求预言)。无嫉妒学习结果是对无遗憾学习结果的放松,它在保持近似福利最优性的同时赋予了它们计算上的易处理性。我们的研究结果扩展到其他拍卖格式,已在文献中研究通过平滑范例。我们的结果XOS估值启用了一种新的跟随扰动领导者算法的设置专家的数量是无限的,学习者的回报函数是非线性的。该算法在拍卖设置之外也有应用,例如安全游戏。我们的结果覆盖估值是基于一种新的使…
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学);Central China Normal University(华中师范大学);Shanghai University of Finance and Economics(上海财经大学);Great Bay University(大湾区大学)
本文研究了双边市场中在线定价问题,提出双价格和分段价格机制,分别在利润和GFT最大化中取得O(n² log log T)和O(n² log log T + n³)的后悔界。
Learn to Match: Two-Sided Matching with Temporally Extended Feedback
Department of Economics, University of Washington(华盛顿大学经济系);Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington(华盛顿大学保罗·G·艾伦计算机科学与工程学院)