AI 中文总结
针对碳抵消市场流动性低等问题，提出分层成交拍卖机制，将奥苏贝尔成交拍卖推广到分层质量项目场景，能产生有效结果并收取VCG价格，真诚投标是弱占优策略且可多项式时间实现，还可应用于其他相关市场。
AI 中文摘要
自愿碳抵消是企业在全球范围内采用的减少有效碳排放的策略。当前碳抵消市场流动性低，抵消项目高度异质，认证体系分散，且缺乏能为生产者和买家提供明确供需和价格信号的集中交易基础设施。本文提出一种可用于碳抵消销售的升价拍卖机制，它将奥苏贝尔的成交拍卖推广到分层质量项目的场景。成交机制的核心是当对手需求低于供应时为投标人分配项目，这在分层情况下推广到多个嵌套子市场。假设投标人有可接受的最低质量水平且边际效用递减，该拍卖能产生有效结果并收取VCG价格，真诚投标是弱占优策略，且可在多项式时间内实现。此拍卖还可应用于如酒店房间预订、音乐会票务和赞助搜索拍卖等项目可按规模排序且投标人有需求临界点的市场。
英文摘要
Voluntary carbon offsetting is a strategy which has been pursued globally by corporations to reduce their effective carbon emissions. Carbon offset markets currently suffer from low liquidity: offsets are highly heterogeneous, the landscape of accreditation is fragmented, and the market lacks a centralized trading infrastructure which would provide clear demand and price signaling to producers and buyers of offsets. In this paper, we propose an ascending auction mechanism which can be applied to the sale of carbon offsets. It generalizes Ausubel's clinching auction to a setting with items of tiered quality. The central idea behind the clinching mechanism is that bidders are allocated items when their opponents' demand drops below the supply. This is generalized to multiple nested submarkets where clinching can occur in the tiered case. Assuming that bidders have a minimum quality level that they will accept but are indifferent to quality beyond that, along with having decreasing marginal utility, we obtain that the auction generates the efficient outcome and charges VCG prices. As a result, sincere bidding is a weakly dominant strategy given private values. Moreover, the auction can be implemented in polynomial time. Beyond offset markets, this auction can be applied to any market where items can be ordered on a scale and bidders have a cutoff point for desiring items on the scale, such as hotel room bookings, concert ticketing and sponsored search auctions.
