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arXiv 2602.09189econ.TH
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印度的 affirmative action 与层级保留

Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations

Boğaziçi University(博阿齐西大学);Iowa State University(爱荷华州立大学)

Orhan Aygün, Bertan Turhan

AI总结:

本文研究了印度通过层级保留机制实现公平资源配置的问题,提出层级选择规则并证明其有效性。

摘要:

印度实施了世界上最复杂的 affirmative action 计划,通过垂直和水平保留。尽管申请人最多只能属于一个垂直类别,但他们可以同时符合多个水平保留类别。我们研究了印度的资源配置问题,其中水平保留在一对一的水平匹配框架内具有层级结构。我们引入了层级选择规则,并证明它会选择最优秀的一组申请人。我们彻底分析了聚合选择规则的性质,该规则涵盖了所有垂直类别的层级选择规则。我们证明,当将通用延迟接受机制与该聚合选择规则结合时,是唯一稳定且策略无害的机制,能够消除正当的嫉妒。

英文摘要:

We study the design of affirmative action mechanisms, focusing on India's system of horizontal reservations within vertical reservations. We consider a one-to-all policy, under which an applicant eligible for multiple horizontal categories simultaneously contributes toward each category's minimum guarantee. When horizontal reservations have a hierarchical structure, we introduce a choice rule that selects the unique merit-optimal set of applicants subject to these guaranties, satisfies the substitutes condition and size monotonicity. In a matching-with-contracts framework, we show that the generalized deferred acceptance mechanism is stable, strategy-proof, and eliminates justified envy under aggregate choice rules using the hierarchical choice rule in each vertical category. We establish a fundamental trade-off between merit and affirmative action between the one-to-all and one-to-one counting policies.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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