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arXiv 2004.13261econ.TH
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广义词典选择规则的匹配

Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules

Orhan Aygün, Bertan Turhan

摘要:

出于现实世界的匹配问题的需要,本文制定了一个大类的实际选择规则,广义词典选择规则(GLCR),机构组成的多个部门。机构填补他们的部门顺序,每个部门被赋予一个子选择规则,满足经典的可替代性和规模单调性结合一个新的属性,我们介绍,配额单调性。我们允许部门之间以能力转移的形式进行丰富的互动。一个制度的总体选择规则被定义为它的部门的子选择的联合。与GLCR相关的累积报价机制(COM)是唯一稳定的防策略机制。我们定义了一个基于选择的改进概念,并表明COM尊重改进。我们在我们的配套论文Aygün和Turhan(2020)中采用了本文中开发的理论,为印度设计了具有全面平权行动约束的令人满意的匹配机制。

英文摘要:

Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions that consist of multiple divisions. Institutions fill their divisions sequentially, and each division is endowed with a sub-choice rule that satisfies classical substitutability and size monotonicity in conjunction with a new property that we introduce, quota monotonicity. We allow rich interactions between divisions in the form of capacity transfers. The overall choice rule of an institution is defined as the union of the sub-choices of its divisions. The cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with respect to GLCR is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We define a choice-based improvement notion and show that the COM respects improvements. We employ the theory developed in this paper in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2020), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints.

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