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arXiv 2512.12804cs.AI
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因果反事实重新考虑

Causal Counterfactuals Reconsidered

University College London(伦敦大学学院)

Sander Beckers

AI总结:

本文提出了一种扩展的反事实概率语义,结合了对因果决定论的否定与对反事实语义可能性的认可。

摘要:

我提出了一种新的反事实概率语义,它扩展了标准的佩尔语义:它适用于无法扩展为现实结构因果模型的概率因果模型,因此超出了佩尔语义的范围。这种扩展是必要的,因为,如我所展示的,即使在简单的设置中,这样的概率因果模型也会出现。我的语义在长期存在的佩尔和达维德之间关于反事实的争论中提供了一种自然的折中:我同意达维德认为普遍的因果决定论和不现实的变量应被拒绝,但我也同意佩尔认为反事实的一般语义仍然是可能的。我专注于满足马尔可夫条件、只包含现实变量且因果完整的因果模型。尽管我使用结构因果模型来提出我的提议,如佩尔所做的,但我避免使用所谓的响应变量。此外,我证明了我的语义等同于两个其他最近的提议,这些提议不涉及结构因果模型,并且与文献中关于随机反事实的各种评论一致。在整个过程中,我还反思了马尔可夫条件的普遍性,并探索了因果抽象的一种新扩展。

英文摘要:

I develop a novel semantics for probabilities of counterfactuals that generalizes the standard Pearlian semantics: it applies to probabilistic causal models that cannot be extended into realistic structural causal models and are therefore beyond the scope of Pearl's semantics. This generalization is needed because, as I show, such probabilistic causal models arise even in simple settings. My semantics offer a natural compromize in the long-standing debate between Pearl and Dawid over counterfactuals: I agree with Dawid that universal causal determinism and unrealistic variables should be rejected, but I agree with Pearl that a general semantics of counterfactuals is nonetheless possible. I restrict attention to causal models that satisfy the Markov condition, only contain realistic variables, and are causally complete. Although I formulate my proposal using structural causal models, as does Pearl, I refrain from using so-called response variables. Moreover, I prove that my semantics is equivalent to two other recent proposals that do not involve structural causal models, and that it is in line with various comments on stochastic counterfactuals that have appeared in the literature more broadly. Throughout I also reflect on the universality of the Markov condition and explore a novel generalization of causal abstractions

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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