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arXiv 1106.2647cs.AI
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从因果模型到反事实结构

From Causal Models To Counterfactual Structures

Cornell University(康奈尔大学)

Joseph Y. Halpern

摘要:

加尔斯和珀尔声称:“对于递归模型,因果模型框架没有给反事实增加任何限制,除了刘易斯的框架所施加的限制。这一主张被仔细研究,目的是澄清因果模型和刘易斯框架之间的确切关系。递归模型被证明是精确对应于(可能世界)反事实结构的一个子类。另一方面,递归模型的轻微推广,模型中所有方程都有唯一的解决方案,被证明是无与伦比的表达能力,反事实的结构,尽管事实上,加勒和珍珠的论点应该适用于他们以及。加勒和珀尔论证的问题是:一个公理,他们认为是无关紧要的,因为它涉及析取(这是不是在他们的语言),是不是无关紧要的。

英文摘要:

Galles and Pearl claimed that "for recursive models, the causal model framework does not add any restrictions to counterfactuals, beyond those imposed by Lewis's [possible-worlds] framework." This claim is examined carefully, with the goal of clarifying the exact relationship between causal models and Lewis's framework. Recursive models are shown to correspond precisely to a subclass of (possible-world) counterfactual structures. On the other hand, a slight generalization of recursive models, models where all equations have unique solutions, is shown to be incomparable in expressive power to counterfactual structures, despite the fact that the Galles and Pearl arguments should apply to them as well. The problem with the Galles and Pearl argument is identified: an axiom that they viewed as irrelevant, because it involved disjunction (which was not in their language), is not irrelevant at all.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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