arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2511.07201math.PR
收藏

双重秘书问题

A Double Secretary Problem

Victoria Academy(维多利亚学院)

Shoou-Ren Hsiau, Yi-Shen Lin

AI总结:

针对包含2n名申请者(n种质量各两名)的双重秘书问题,证明其具有单调结构且单阶段前瞻阈值规则最优,研究了该规则及最大概率的极限行为并与经典秘书问题比较。

摘要:

我们考虑一个双重秘书问题,其中包含2n名申请者,他们具有n种不同的质量,每种质量各有两名申请者。与经典秘书问题(CSP)一样,申请者由经理按随机顺序依次面试,经理希望找到一个最优停止规则,以最大化选中两名最佳申请者之一的概率。我们证明该问题具有单调结构,因此相应的单阶段前瞻规则(阈值型)是最优的。我们研究了该规则和最大概率的极限行为,并与经典秘书问题的情况进行了比较。

英文摘要:

We consider a double secretary problem which contains $2n$ applicants of $n$ different qualities, two of each quality. As in the classical secretary problem (CSP), the applicants are interviewed sequentially in a random order by a manager and the manager wants to find an optimal stopping rule that maximizes the probability of selecting one of the two best applicants. We prove that the problem leads to a monotone structure and so the corresponding one-stage look-ahead rule (which is of threshold type) is optimal. The limiting behavior of the rule and of the maximum probability are studied and compared with that of the CSP.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑