We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the ensuing payoff tuple is of the form $(A,A^\top)$ (where $A$ is the $2 \times 2$ payoff matrix corresponding to the first player). Such symmetric games commonly arise in real-world interactions between 'symmetric" agents who have identically defined utility functions -- such as Bertrand competition and multi-agent performative prediction, and display a rich multiplicity of equilibria despite the seemingly simple setting. Somewhat surprisingly, we show through a first-principles analysis that the exponential weights dynamic, which is popular in online learning, converges in the last iterate for such games regardless of initialization with an appropriately chosen step size. For certain games and/or initializations, we further show that the convergence rate is in fact exponential and holds for any step size.
We illustrate our theory with extensive simulations and applications to the aforementioned game-theoretic interactions. In the case of multi-agent performative prediction, we formulate a new "mortgage competition" game between lenders (i.e. banks) who interact with a population of customers, and show that it fits into our framework.
CyberAgent, Inc.（赛博艾坚特公司）；University of Electro-Communications（电气通信大学）
In this study, we consider a variant of the Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) dynamics in two-player zero-sum games. FTRL is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium when time-averaging the strategies, while a lot of variants suffer from the issue of limit cycling behavior, i.e., lack the last-iterate convergence guarantee. To this end, we propose mutant FTRL (M-FTRL), an algorithm that introduces mutation for the perturbation of action probabilities. We then investigate the continuous-time dynamics of M-FTRL and provide the strong convergence guarantees toward stationary points that ap…
While classic work in convex-concave min-max optimization relies on average-iterate convergence results, the emergence of nonconvex applications such as training Generative Adversarial Networks has led to renewed interest in last-iterate convergence guarantees. Proving last-iterate convergence is challenging because many natural algorithms, such as Simultaneous Gradient Descent/Ascent, provably diverge or cycle even in simple convex-concave min-max settings, and previous work on global last-iterate convergence rates has been limited to the bilinear and convex-strongly concave settings. In this…
In this paper we study the smooth convex-concave saddle point problem. Specifically, we analyze the last iterate convergence properties of the Extragradient (EG) algorithm. It is well known that the ergodic (averaged) iterates of EG converge at a rate of $O(1/T)$ (Nemirovski, 2004). In this paper, we show that the last iterate of EG converges at a rate of $O(1/\sqrt{T})$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a convergence rate guarantee for the last iterate of EG for the smooth convex-concave saddle point problem. Moreover, we show that this rate is tight by proving…
Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent (OGDA) and Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU) for saddle-point optimization have received growing attention due to their favorable last-iterate convergence. However, their behaviors for simple bilinear games over the probability simplex are still not fully understood - previous analysis lacks explicit convergence rates, only applies to an exponentially small learning rate, or requires additional assumptions such as the uniqueness of the optimal solution. In this work, we significantly expand the understanding of last-iterate convergence for OGDA …
Efficient Last-iterate Convergence Algorithms in Solving Games
National Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University（南京大学新型软件技术国家重点实验室）；Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Hong Kong Institute of Science & Innovation, CAS（中国科学院香港创新研究院人工智能与机器人中心）；Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security and Intelligent Processing, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications（南京邮电大学江苏省大数据安全与智能处理重点实验室）；Microsoft Corporation（微软公司）；School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学计算机科学与工程学院）
MIT CSAIL（麻省理工学院计算机科学与人工智能实验室）；MIT EECS（麻省理工学院电子工程与计算机科学系）
We study the question of obtaining last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning algorithms in multi-player games. We show that the optimistic gradient (OG) algorithm with a constant step-size, which is no-regret, achieves a last-iterate rate of $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ with respect to the gap function in smooth monotone games. This result addresses a question of Mertikopoulos & Zhou (2018), who asked whether extra-gradient approaches (such as OG) can be applied to achieve improved guarantees in the multi-agent learning setting. The proof of our upper bound uses a new technique centered around …
Many problems in machine learning and game theory can be formulated as saddle-point problems, for which various first-order methods have been developed and proven efficient in practice. Under the general convex-concave assumption, most first-order methods only guarantee an ergodic convergence rate, that is, the uniform averages of the iterates converge at a $O(1/T)$ rate in terms of the saddle-point residual. However, numerically, the iterates themselves can often converge much faster than the uniform averages. This observation motivates increasing averaging schemes that put more weight on lat…
Johns Hopkins University（约翰斯·霍普金斯大学）；University of California, Los Angeles（加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校）；Harvard University（哈佛大学）
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) has been shown to generalize well in many deep learning applications. In practice, one often runs SGD with a geometrically decaying stepsize, i.e., a constant initial stepsize followed by multiple geometric stepsize decay, and uses the last iterate as the output. This kind of SGD is known to be nearly minimax optimal for classical finite-dimensional linear regression problems (Ge et al., 2019). However, a sharp analysis for the last iterate of SGD in the overparameterized setting is still open. In this paper, we provide a problem-dependent analysis on the last…
Northeast Normal University（东北师范大学）；Changchun Humanities and Sciences College（长春人文学院）；Imperial College London（帝国理工学院）
The stochastic momentum method is a commonly used acceleration technique for solving large-scale stochastic optimization problems in artificial neural networks. Current convergence results of stochastic momentum methods under non-convex stochastic settings mostly discuss convergence in terms of the random output and minimum output. To this end, we address the convergence of the last iterate output (called last-iterate convergence) of the stochastic momentum methods for non-convex stochastic optimization problems, in a way conformal with traditional optimization theory. We prove the last-iterat…
We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent algorithm on each state to learn the policies, with a critic that slowly learns the value of each state. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm in this setting that is simultaneously rational (converging to the opponent's best response when it uses a stationary policy), convergent (converging to the set of Nash equilibria under…
Boston University（波士顿大学）；George Mason University（乔治梅森大学）
SGD with Momentum (SGDM) is a widely used family of algorithms for large-scale optimization of machine learning problems. Yet, when optimizing generic convex functions, no advantage is known for any SGDM algorithm over plain SGD. Moreover, even the most recent results require changes to the SGDM algorithms, like averaging of the iterates and a projection onto a bounded domain, which are rarely used in practice. In this paper, we focus on the convergence rate of the last iterate of SGDM. For the first time, we prove that for any constant momentum factor, there exists a Lipschitz and convex func…
Last-Iterate Convergence of Adaptive Riemannian Gradient Descent for Equilibrium Computation
Department of Computer Science, Yale University（耶鲁大学计算机科学系）；Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, UC Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校电气工程与计算机科学系）；Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University（哥伦比亚大学工业工程与运筹学系）；Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校计算机科学系）
Last-Iterate Convergence of Clipped SGD with Linear Decay
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology（南京理工大学计算机科学与工程学院）；National Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University（南京大学计算机软件新技术国家重点实验室）；Nanjing University（南京大学）
The monotone variational inequality is a central problem in mathematical programming that unifies and generalizes many important settings such as smooth convex optimization, two-player zero-sum games, convex-concave saddle point problems, etc. The extragradient algorithm by Korpelevich [1976] and the optimistic gradient descent-ascent algorithm by Popov [1980] are arguably the two most classical and popular methods for solving monotone variational inequalities. Despite their long histories, the following major problem remains open. What is the last-iterate convergence rate of the extragradient…
Microsoft Research（微软研究院）；Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院）
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is one of the most widely used algorithms for large scale optimization problems. While classical theoretical analysis of SGD for convex problems studies (suffix) \emph{averages} of iterates and obtains information theoretically optimal bounds on suboptimality, the \emph{last point} of SGD is, by far, the most preferred choice in practice. The best known results for last point of SGD \cite{shamir2013stochastic} however, are suboptimal compared to information theoretic lower bounds by a $\log T$ factor, where $T$ is the number of iterations. \cite{harvey2018tigh…
Motivated by the recent successes of neural networks that have the ability to fit the data perfectly and generalize well, we study the noiseless model in the fundamental least-squares setup. We assume that an optimum predictor fits perfectly inputs and outputs $\langle θ_* , ϕ(X) \rangle = Y$, where $ϕ(X)$ stands for a possibly infinite dimensional non-linear feature map. To solve this problem, we consider the estimator given by the last iterate of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with constant step-size. In this context, our contribution is two fold: (i) from a (stochastic) optimization pers…
Last-Iterate Analyses of FTRL with the 1/2-Tsallis Entropy in Stochastic Bandits
School of Mathematical Sciences, Peking University（北京大学数学科学学院）；Center for Applied Statistics and School of Statistics, Renmin University of China（中国人民大学统计学院）
Extragradient method (EG) (Korpelevich, 1976) is one of the most popular methods for solving saddle point and variational inequalities problems (VIP). Despite its long history and significant attention in the optimization community, there remain important open questions about convergence of EG. In this paper, we resolve one of such questions and derive the first last-iterate $O(1/K)$ convergence rate for EG for monotone and Lipschitz VIP without any additional assumptions on the operator unlike the only known result of this type (Golowich et al., 2020) that relies on the Lipschitzness of the J…
ENS（巴黎高等师范学院）；Univ. PSL（巴黎文理研究大学）；Univ. Grenoble Alpes（格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Grenoble INP（格勒诺布尔国立理工学院）；Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；Criteo AI Lab（Criteo人工智能实验室）
In this paper, we analyze the local convergence rate of optimistic mirror descent methods in stochastic variational inequalities, a class of optimization problems with important applications to learning theory and machine learning. Our analysis reveals an intricate relation between the algorithm's rate of convergence and the local geometry induced by the method's underlying Bregman function. We quantify this relation by means of the Legendre exponent, a notion that we introduce to measure the growth rate of the Bregman divergence relative to the ambient norm near a solution. We show that this …
Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of computationally simple agents an appealing direction. In this work, we analyze the behavior of agents that incrementally adapt their strategy through gradient ascent on expected payoff, in the simple setting of two-player, two-action, iterated general-sum games, and present a surprising result. We show that either the agents will converge to Nash equilibrium, or…
In this paper, the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problem for continuous games with coupled affine inequality constraints is investigated in a partial-decision information scenario, where each player can only access its neighbors' information through local communication although its cost function possibly depends on all other players' strategies. To this end, a novel decentralized primal-dual algorithm based on consensus and dual diffusion methods is devised for seeking the variational GNE of the studied games. This paper also provides theoretical analysis to show that the designed…
This paper studies the mechanisms, implications, and potential applications of the recently discovered class of Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies in iterated 2x2 games. These strategies were reported to successfully extort pure economic maximizers, and to mischievously determine the set of feasible long-term payoffs in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma by enforcing linear constraints on both players' expected average scores. These results are generalized for all symmetric 2x2 games and a general Battle of the Sexes, exemplified by four common games. Additionally, a comparison to conventional strategi…
Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results and techniques that apply to broader families of games and learning dynamics. First, we use a regret-based analysis to show that in a class of games that includes constant-sum polymatrix and strategically zero-sum games, dynamics such as \emph{optimistic mirror descent (OMD)} have \emph{bounded second-order path lengths}, a property which holds even when play…
The Power of Regularization in Solving Extensive-Form Games
Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University（清华大学交叉信息研究院）；LIDS, EECS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院信息学院）；University of Maryland, College Park（马里兰大学帕克分校）
