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arXiv 2408.07227q-fin.TRecon.TH
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稳定币市场中的信息结构

Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets

Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学)

Brian Zhu

AI总结:

本文通过全局博弈模型分析稳定币市场中的信息结构,揭示了大规模抛售和储备质量对跑路概率的影响,提出区分基本面风险区域的方法,并探讨其现实应用。

摘要:

稳定币历史上因价格偏离原因,可能源于大规模抛售,可能是投机性的,或储备资产质量差。利用一个解决这两个问题的全局博弈模型,我们显示,当存在大规模抛售时,对稳定币持有者的抛压增加。虽然精确的公开知识在基本面强劲时减少(在基本面薄弱时增加)跑路的概率,但有趣的是,更精确的私人信号在基本面强劲时增加(在基本面薄弱时减少)跑路的概率,这可能解释了不透明稳定币的稳定性。总跑路概率可以分解为代表大额抛售和劣质抵押品风险的组成部分。通过分析这些风险组成部分如何随着信息不确定性和基本面变化,我们可以根据稳定币发行者更易受哪种风险类型来划分基本面空间。我们建议可检验的含义,并将我们模型的含义与现实世界应用连接起来,包括脱锚事件和货币的无问题性质。

英文摘要:

Stablecoins have historically depegged due from par to large sales, possibly of speculative nature, or poor reserve asset quality. Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. The total run probability can be decomposed into components representing risks from large sales and poor collateral. By analyzing how these risk components vary with respect to information uncertainty and fundamentals, we can split the fundamental space into regions based on the type of risk a stablecoin issuer is more prone to. We suggest testable implications and connect our model's implications to real-world applications, including depegging events and the no-questions-asked property of money.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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