论信息效率与金融稳定
On information efficiency and financial stability
摘要:
我们研究一个简单的模型,资产市场的知情和非知情的代理人。在不存在非知情代理人的情况下,当拥有不同私人信息的交易者数量足够大时,市场成为信息有效的。在引入非知情代理人,我们发现,后者有助于显着的交易活动,当且仅当市场是(近)信息有效。这表明,信息效率可能是泡沫现象的必要条件,由不知情的交易者的行为,或相反,扔一些沙子在金融市场的齿轮可以抑制泡沫的发生。
英文摘要:
We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough. Upon introducing non-informed agents, we find that the latter contribute significantly to the trading activity if and only if the market is (nearly) information efficient. This suggests that information efficiency might be a necessary condition for bubble phenomena, induced by the behavior of non-informed traders, or conversely that throwing some sands in the gears of financial markets may curb the occurrence of bubbles.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。