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arXiv 1902.01157q-fin.TRmath.OCq-fin.MF
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一般强度下部分信息下的最优做市

Optimal market making under partial information with general intensities

Diego Zabaljauregui, Luciano Campi

摘要:

从Avellaneda-Stoikov框架开始,我们考虑一个做市商,他希望在有限的时间范围内最优地设置出价/要价,以最大化她的期望效用。她收到的订单的强度不仅取决于她引用的价差,还取决于隐马尔可夫链模型中不可观察的因素。我们解决这个随机控制问题下的部分信息与模型,统一和概括了许多现有的充分的信息下,结合几个风险度量和约束,并使用一般的强度递减泛函。利用随机滤波、控制和分段确定性马尔可夫过程理论,对问题进行降维,并将降维后的值函数刻画为动态规划方程的唯一连续粘性解.然后,我们解决了类似的完全信息问题,并通过一个具体的例子数值比较的结果。我们发现,最佳的全信息价差是有偏见的,当确切的市场制度是未知的,做市商需要调整额外的制度不确定性方面的P&L的敏感性和观察到的订单流波动。订单之间的等待时间越长,这种影响越大。

英文摘要:

Starting from the Avellaneda-Stoikov framework, we consider a market maker who wants to optimally set bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders she receives depend not only on the spreads she quotes, but also on unobservable factors modelled by a hidden Markov chain. We tackle this stochastic control problem under partial information with a model that unifies and generalizes many existing ones under full information, combining several risk metrics and constraints, and using general decreasing intensity functionals. We use stochastic filtering, control and piecewise-deterministic Markov processes theory, to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and characterize the reduced value function as the unique continuous viscosity solution of its dynamic programming equation. We then solve the analogous full information problem and compare the results numerically through a concrete example. We show that the optimal full information spreads are biased when the exact market regime is unknown, and the market maker needs to adjust for additional regime uncertainty in terms of P&L sensitivity and observed order flow volatility. This effect becomes higher, the longer the waiting time in between orders.

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