选区重划改革通过约束党派参与者来减少杰利蝾螈
Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors
AI总结:
研究将选区重划建模为序贯博弈并计算单变量得分,利用双重差分设计证明约束党派参与者的改革能有效减少党派偏见并提升竞争力,反事实分析表明多方位限制党派的改革比保留部分控制的委员会更有效。
摘要:
政治参与者常操纵选区重划计划以获取选举优势,这一过程被称为杰利蝾螈。多个州已实施制度改革来解决此问题,如建立地图绘制委员会。由于各州的流程和规则结构不同,评估此类改革的影响颇具挑战。我们将选区重划建模为序贯博弈,其均衡解将多步骤制度交互概括为单变量得分。我们认为该得分衡量了政治参与者对最终计划党派倾向的回旋余地。使用双重差分设计,我们证明改革在约束党派参与者时能减少党派偏见并提升竞争力。我们进行了反事实政策分析,以估计在全国范围内实施近期改革的效果。尽管委员会通常能减少偏见,但以多种方式限制党派参与者的改革(如取消否决点的密歇根州)比政党保留部分控制权的委员会(如俄亥俄州)更有效。
英文摘要:
Political actors often manipulate redistricting plans to gain electoral advantages, a process known as gerrymandering. Several states have implemented institutional reforms to address this problem, such as establishing map-drawing commissions. Estimating the impact of such reforms is challenging because each state structures its processes and rules differently. We model redistricting as a sequential game whose equilibrium solution summarizes multi-step institutional interactions as a univariate score. We argue this score measures the leeway political actors have over the partisan lean of the final plan. Using a differences-in-differences design, we demonstrate that reforms reduce partisan bias and increase competitiveness when they constrain partisan actors. We perform a counterfactual policy analysis to estimate the effects of enacting recent reforms nationwide. Though commissions generally reduce bias, reforms that restrict partisan actors in multiple ways, like removing veto points (Michigan), are more effective than commissions where parties retain some control (Ohio).
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