In this note, we examine voting on four major blockchain DAOs: Aave, Compound, Lido and Uniswap. Using data directly collected from the Ethereum blockchain, we examine voter activity.
We find that in most votes, the "minimal quorum," i.e., the smallest number of active voters who could swing the vote is quite small.
To understand who is actually driving these DAOs, we use data from the Ethereum Name Service (ENS), Sybil.org, and Compound, to divide voters into different categories.
Voting Biases in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Governance
Private Sector(私营部门);IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca(卢卡高等研究学院);Complexity Science Hub Vienna(维也纳复杂科学中心);University of Mannheim(曼海姆大学);GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences(GESIS - 莱布尼茨社会科学研究所)
Data-driven and distributed governance of building facilities management using decentralized autonomous organization, digital twin, and large language models
School of Technology, Eastern Illinois University(东伊利诺伊大学技术学院);Myers-Lawson School of Construction, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University(弗吉尼亚理工学院和州立大学迈尔斯-劳森建设学院)
The Last Vote: A Multi-Stakeholder Framework for Language Model Governance
Berkeley AI Safety Initiative (BASIS)(伯克利人工智能安全倡议);Cyber Physical Systems Lab(网络物理系统实验室);UC Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);University of Texas, Dallas(德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校)
User Negotiations of Authenticity, Ownership, and Governance on AI-Generated Video Platforms: Evidence from Sora
Independent Researcher(独立研究者);Stevenson High School(史蒂文森高中);MTN Nigeria(尼日利亚MTN);University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);University of Texas at San Antonio(德克萨斯大学圣安东尼奥分校)
Credibility Governance: A Social Mechanism for Collective Self-Correction under Weak Truth Signals
School of Artificial Intelligence, Wuhan University(武汉大学人工智能学院);Tsinghua University(清华大学);University of California, Los Angeles(加州大学洛杉矶分校);State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, BIGAI(通用人工智能国家重点实验室,BIGAI)