去中心化自治组织（DAO）治理中的投票偏差
Voting Biases in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Governance
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究去中心化自治组织（DAO）治理中投票偏差问题，通过将投票权份额与选择的支持导向立场、在列表中的位置及是否由提案作者选择等特征关联，发现作者选择的选择关联最强，结果凸显治理中相关因素应作为制度设计考量。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
去中心化自治组织（DAOs）使用代币加权投票来分配资源、设置协议规则并使集体决策合法化。然而，DAO 投票中的支持明显集中。我们在提案选择层面研究 DAO 的治理，将每个选择的投票权份额与三个可观察特征联系起来：它是否表达支持导向立场、在选择列表中的位置以及是否由提案作者选择。我们发现：作者选择的选择与投票权份额关联最强且最稳健，相对于非作者选择增加了 58.8%；支持导向的选择保持积极但稍欠一致的优势（27.1%）；首个列出的选择也系统性地吸引更高份额，符合位置和顺序效应（7.7%）。结果在多种规范下都很稳健。结果将注意力从提案结果本身转移到选择呈现的界面和社会信号上。在 DAO 治理中，排序、作者信号和投票可见性应被视为制度设计选择，而非中立的实施细节。
英文摘要
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) use token-weighted voting to allocate resources, set protocol rules, and legitimate collective decisions. Yet, support in DAO voting is strikingly concentrated. What happens inside the ballot that produces this concentration? We study DAOs' governance at the proposal-choice level, linking each choice's voting-power share to three observable features: whether it expresses an approval-oriented stance, where it appears in the choice list, and whether it is selected by the proposal author. We find that (i) author-selected choices show the strongest and most robust association with voting-power share, with a 58.8% increase relative to non-author choices; (ii) approval-oriented choices retain a positive but slightly less consistent advantage (27.1%); and (iii) first-listed choices also attract systematically higher shares, consistent with position and order effects (7.7%). Results are robust across several specifications, which include subtracting an author's own voting power from computations. We use bias descriptively, to denote systematic associations rather than proven causal distortion. The results shift attention from proposal outcomes alone to the interface and social signals through which choices are presented. In DAO governance, ordering, author signals, and vote visibility should be treated as institutional design choices, not neutral implementation details.
