量化自动做市商中的套利:以太坊ZK Rollups的实证研究
Quantifying Arbitrage in Automated Market Makers: An Empirical Study of Ethereum ZK Rollups
AI总结:
本文研究以太坊ZK rollups上AMM与CEX间的套利机会,提出衡量最大套利价值(MAV)的理论框架与公式,并实证分析SyncSwap与Binance间的历史MAV及价格纠正速度。
摘要:
套利源于在不同市场同时买卖相同资产以从价格差异中获利。本文系统性地研究了以太坊ZK rollups上的自动做市商(AMM)与中心化交易所(CEX)之间的套利机会。首先,我们提出了一个理论框架来衡量此类套利机会,并推导出相关最大套利价值(MAV)的公式,该公式考虑了交易场所中的价格分歧和可用流动性。然后,我们实证测量了zkSync Era上的AMM SyncSwap与Binance之间可用的历史MAV,并调查了价格错位相对于显性和隐性市场成本被纠正的速度。总体而言,2023年7月至9月期间,USDC-ETH SyncSwap池的累计MAV达到104.96千美元(占交易量的0.24%)。
英文摘要:
Arbitrage can arise from the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset in different markets in order to profit from a difference in its price. This work systematically reviews arbitrage opportunities between Automated Market Makers (AMMs) on Ethereum ZK rollups, and Centralised Exchanges (CEXs). First, we propose a theoretical framework to measure such arbitrage opportunities and derive a formula for the related Maximal Arbitrage Value (MAV) that accounts for both price divergences and liquidity available in the trading venues. Then, we empirically measure the historical MAV available between SyncSwap, an AMM on zkSync Era, and Binance, and investigate how quickly misalignments in price are corrected against explicit and implicit market costs. Overall, the cumulative MAV from July to September 2023 on the USDC-ETH SyncSwap pool amounts to $104.96k (0.24% of trading volume).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。