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arXiv 2403.14020cs.CRcs.NI
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零知识证明不同身份:面向 C-ITS 的符合标准的抗女巫攻击假名扩展

Zero-Knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity: a Standard-compatible Sybil-resistant Pseudonym Extension for C-ITS

Ye Tao, Hongyi Wu, Ehsan Javanmardi, Manabu Tsukada, Hiroshi Esaki

AI总结:

本文提出 zk-PoDI 协议,基于丢番图方程和 zk-SNARK,使车辆在不泄露身份的前提下证明自己不是本地区域内其他假名的所有者,从而在不依赖特定假名设计或基础设施辅助的情况下抵抗 C-ITS 中的女巫攻击。

摘要:

假名在协作式智能交通系统(C-ITS)中被广泛用于保护车辆的位置隐私。然而,假名的不可链接性也使得女巫攻击成为可能,即恶意车辆可以同时伪装成多辆车。在本文中,我们提出了一种名为零知识证明不同身份(zk-PoDI)的新协议,该协议允许车辆在不泄露其真实身份的情况下,证明自己不是本地区域内另一个假名的所有者。zk-PoDI 基于丢番图方程和 zk-SNARK,不依赖任何特定的假名设计或基础设施辅助。我们证明 zk-PoDI 满足实用的抗女巫攻击假名系统的所有要求,并且具有低延迟、可调难度、适中的计算开销和可忽略的通信成本。我们还讨论了未来在现实城市规模仿真环境中实现和评估 zk-PoDI 的工作。

英文摘要:

Pseudonyms are widely used in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) to protect the location privacy of vehicles. However, the unlinkability nature of pseudonyms also enables Sybil attacks, where a malicious vehicle can pretend to be multiple vehicles at the same time. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol called zero-knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity (zk-PoDI,) which allows a vehicle to prove that it is not the owner of another pseudonym in the local area, without revealing its actual identity. Zk-PoDI is based on the Diophantine equation and zk-SNARK, and does not rely on any specific pseudonym design or infrastructure assistance. We show that zk-PoDI satisfies all the requirements for a practical Sybil-resistance pseudonym system, and it has low latency, adjustable difficulty, moderate computation overhead, and negligible communication cost. We also discuss the future work of implementing and evaluating zk-PoDI in a realistic city-scale simulation environment.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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