arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2008.05300cs.CR
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谁在监视监视者?人格证明协议中Sybil抵抗的主观方法综述

Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols

Divya Siddarth, Sergey Ivliev, Santiago Siri, Paula Berman

摘要:

大多数当前的自我主权身份系统可以被归类为严格客观的,由可信的第三方证明者发布的加密签名声明组成。未能为主观性提供投入是一个核心挑战:无法解决“谁来核查核查者?".相反,这些协议将其合法性外包给其内部结构之外的机制,依赖于传统的集中式机构,如国家身份证发行商和KYC提供商来验证他们持有的声明。这种依赖性被用来保护应用程序免受以前认为在分布式系统中不可能解决的漏洞的影响:Sybil攻击问题,它描述了通过创建许多非法虚拟角色来滥用在线系统的情况。受加密货币和区块链技术进步的启发,最近出现了一种利用主观输入(如投票、担保和解释)的网络协议,以达成一种去中心化的、抗sybil的身份共识。在本文中,我们将概述这些新的本地数字身份验证来源的方法-它们的属性,方法的优点和缺点-并勾勒出未来发展的可能方向。

英文摘要:

Most current self-sovereign identity systems may be categorized as strictly objective, consisting of cryptographically signed statements issued by trusted third party attestors. This failure to provide an input for subjectivity accounts for a central challenge: the inability to address the question of "Who verifies the verifier?". Instead, these protocols outsource their legitimacy to mechanisms beyond their internal structure, relying on traditional centralized institutions such as national ID issuers and KYC providers to verify the claims they hold. This reliance has been employed to safeguard applications from a vulnerability previously thought to be impossible to address in distributed systems: the Sybil attack problem, which describes the abuse of an online system by creating many illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching, and interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and sybil-resistant consensus for identity. In this article, we will outline the approaches of these new and natively digital sources of authentication -- their attributes, methodologies strengths, and weaknesses -- and sketch out possible directions for future developments.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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