数字民主中的身份与人格：评估假名政党中的包容性、平等性、安全性和隐私性以及人格的其他证明
Identity and Personhood in Digital Democracy: Evaluating Inclusion, Equality, Security, and Privacy in Pseudonym Parties and Other Proofs of Personhood
摘要：
数字身份似乎是数字民主的先决条件：我们如何在不确定选民身份的情况下确保在线“一人一票”？但数字身份解决方案--身份检查、生物识别、自我主权身份和信任网络--都存在缺陷，使用户容易受到排斥、身份丢失或盗窃以及胁迫。这些缺陷可能是无法克服的，因为数字身份是一辆拉着马的车。我们无法实现足够安全的数字身份，以承受数字民主的重量，除非我们将其建立在“数字人格”的坚实基础上。“身份是通过属性或从属关系将一个人与另一个人区分开来，而人格是赋予所有真实的人独立于身份的不可剥夺的数字参与权，包括保护他们的民主权利免受身份丢失，盗窃，胁迫或伪造的侵蚀。我们探索和分析替代方法，以“证明人格”，可能会提供这种缺失的基础。假名派对将周期性物理世界事件的透明度与事件之间的数字令牌的力量结合起来。这些代币代表了期限有限但可再生的权利要求，可用于在线投票或流动民主，抽样陪审团或审议性民意调查，抗滥用社交通信或以未经许可的加密货币铸造普遍基本收入等目的。加强假名党，为参与者提供一个强制的物理安全和隐私的时刻，可以解决胁迫和购买选票的风险，困扰今天的电子投票系统。我们还研究了其他提出的证明人格的方法，其中一些提供了便利，如全在线参与。不幸的是，这些替代方案目前无法满足所有关键的数字人格目标，但为我们面临的挑战提供了宝贵的见解。
英文摘要：
Digital identity seems like a prerequisite for digital democracy: how can we ensure "one person, one vote" online without identifying voters? But digital identity solutions - ID checking, biometrics, self-sovereign identity, and trust networks - all present flaws, leaving users vulnerable to exclusion, identity loss or theft, and coercion. These flaws may be insurmountable because digital identity is a cart pulling the horse. We cannot achieve digital identity secure enough for the weight of digital democracy, until we build it on a solid foundation of "digital personhood." While identity is about distinguishing one person from another through attributes or affiliations, personhood is about giving all real people inalienable digital participation rights independent of identity, including protection against erosion of their democratic rights through identity loss, theft, coercion, or fakery. We explore and analyze alternative approaches to "proof of personhood" that may provide this missing foundation. Pseudonym parties marry the transparency of periodic physical-world events with the power of digital tokens between events. These tokens represent limited-term but renewable claims usable for purposes such as online voting or liquid democracy, sampled juries or deliberative polls, abuse-resistant social communication, or minting universal basic income in a permissionless cryptocurrency. Enhancing pseudonym parties to provide participants a moment of enforced physical security and privacy can address coercion and vote-buying risks that plague today's E-voting systems. We also examine other proposed approaches to proof of personhood, some of which offer conveniences such as all-online participation. These alternatives currently fall short of satisfying all the key digital personhood goals, unfortunately, but offer valuable insights into the challenges we face.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
