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arXiv 2403.08992quant-ph
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色散光学QKD中的安全性假设

Security Assumptions in Dispersive-Optics QKD

Ariel Shlosberg, Alex Kwiatkowski, Akira Kyle, Graeme Smith

AI总结:

本研究指出色散光学QKD中现有安全性分析高估了安全密钥率,提出一种窃听者更优的替代攻击模型,并证明在某些实验条件下实际安全密钥率为零。

摘要:

量子密钥分发(QKD)旨在提供一种在远程各方之间生成密码学安全密钥的方法,同时保证无条件安全性。利用色散光学(DO-QKD)实现高维QKD的方案已被提出,以允许每个光子传输多个安全比特,同时利用现有电信技术保持成本效益和可扩展性[1]。在最近的文献中,已有多个DO-QKD系统的实验实现[2-6],其安全性分析基于参考文献[1]中的处理。在此,我们证明在有限色散情况下,参考文献[1]中假设的窃听者攻击模型对窃听者而言并非最优,这导致各方之间安全密钥率被显著高估。我们考虑了一种替代攻击模型,只要Alice和Bob仅限于进行DO-QKD中典型的测量,他们就无法区分该模型与参考文献[1]中的模型。我们提供了具体示例,其中两种模型预测的Holevo信息(因此也包括秘密密钥率)之间存在显著差距。我们进一步分析了参考文献[2]中的实验,作为一个案例,其中根据参考文献[1]的模型预测了安全密钥,但实际上,当考虑窃听者可能执行的全部集体攻击时,安全密钥率为零。

英文摘要:

Quantum key distribution (QKD) seeks to provide a method of generating cryptographically-secure keys between remote parties while guaranteeing unconditional security. Implementations of high-dimensional QKD using dispersive-optics (DO-QKD) have been proposed to allow for multiple secure bits to be transmitted per photon while remaining cost-effective and scalable using existing telecommunication technology [1]. In the recent literature, there have been a number of experimental realizations of DO-QKD systems [2-6], with security analysis based on the treatment in Ref. [1]. Here we demonstrate that in the case of finite dispersion, the model assumed for the eavesdropper's attack in Ref. [1] is non-optimal for the eavesdropper, which leads to a significant overestimation of the secure key rate between parties. We consider an alternative attack model that Alice and Bob find indistinguishable from the Ref. [1] model, as long as they are restricted to making the measurements typical in DO-QKD. We provide concrete examples where a significant gap exists between the Holevo information, and therefore the secret key rate, predicted by the two models. We further analyze the experiment in Ref. [2] as an example of a case where secure key is predicted according to the Ref. [1] model, but where in fact there is zero secure key rate when considering the full set of collective attacks that an eavesdropper may perform.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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