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arXiv 2402.09540cs.CRcs.AIcs.LG
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为什么大 Epsilon 的差分隐私能够防御实际的成员推理攻击?

Why Does Differential Privacy with Large Epsilon Defend Against Practical Membership Inference Attacks?

University of Wisconsin-Madison(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校);Vanderbilt University(范德堡大学);Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories(三菱电机研究实验室)

Andrew Lowy, Zhuohang Li, Jing Liu, Toshiaki Koike-Akino, Kieran Parsons, Ye Wang

AI总结:

本文提出新隐私概念 PMP 以建模实际攻击者的不确定性,定量分析表明大 DP 参数能转化为更小的 PMP 参数,从而解释了大 Epsilon 差分隐私防御实际成员推理攻击的有效性,并为参数选择提供指导。

摘要:

对于较小的隐私参数 $ε$,$ε$-差分隐私(DP)提供了强鲁棒的 worst-case 保证,即没有任何成员推理攻击(MIA)能够成功判定某个人的数据是否被用于训练机器学习模型。DP 的保证是 worst-case 的,因为:a) 即使攻击者已经知道数据集中除一人外所有人的记录,它依然成立;b) 它在所有数据集上均匀成立。在实际应用中,这种 worst-case 保证可能大材小用:实际攻击者可能缺乏对(几乎全部)私有数据的精确认知,且从某种意义上说,我们的数据集可能比 worst-case 数据集更容易防御。这些考量促使工业界部署具有大隐私参数(如 $ε\geq 7$)的 DP 模型,并且经验上观察到大 $ε$ 的 DP 能成功抵御 state-of-the-art MIA。现有 DP 理论无法解释这些经验发现:例如,$ε\geq 7$ 的理论隐私保证本质上是空洞的。本文旨在弥合这一理论与实践之间的差距,理解为何大的 DP 参数能阻止实际的 MIA。为解决此问题,我们提出了一种名为 practical membership privacy (PMP) 的新隐私概念。PMP 对实际攻击者关于私有数据内容的不确定性进行了建模。PMP 参数在给定数据集上实际 MIA 的成功率方面具有直观解释。我们定量分析了两种基本 DP 机制的 PMP 参数:指数机制和高斯机制。分析表明,大的 DP 参数通常会转化为小得多的 PMP 参数,从而保证针对实际 MIA 的强隐私性。基于我们的发现,我们为从业者选择 DP 参数提供了原则性指导。

英文摘要:

For small privacy parameter $ε$, $ε$-differential privacy (DP) provides a strong worst-case guarantee that no membership inference attack (MIA) can succeed at determining whether a person's data was used to train a machine learning model. The guarantee of DP is worst-case because: a) it holds even if the attacker already knows the records of all but one person in the data set; and b) it holds uniformly over all data sets. In practical applications, such a worst-case guarantee may be overkill: practical attackers may lack exact knowledge of (nearly all of) the private data, and our data set might be easier to defend, in some sense, than the worst-case data set. Such considerations have motivated the industrial deployment of DP models with large privacy parameter (e.g. $ε\geq 7$), and it has been observed empirically that DP with large $ε$ can successfully defend against state-of-the-art MIAs. Existing DP theory cannot explain these empirical findings: e.g., the theoretical privacy guarantees of $ε\geq 7$ are essentially vacuous. In this paper, we aim to close this gap between theory and practice and understand why a large DP parameter can prevent practical MIAs. To tackle this problem, we propose a new privacy notion called practical membership privacy (PMP). PMP models a practical attacker's uncertainty about the contents of the private data. The PMP parameter has a natural interpretation in terms of the success rate of a practical MIA on a given data set. We quantitatively analyze the PMP parameter of two fundamental DP mechanisms: the exponential mechanism and Gaussian mechanism. Our analysis reveals that a large DP parameter often translates into a much smaller PMP parameter, which guarantees strong privacy against practical MIAs. Using our findings, we offer principled guidance for practitioners in choosing the DP parameter.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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