arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2004.05703cs.LGcs.CRstat.ML

DarkneTZ: Towards Model Privacy at the Edge using Trusted Execution Environments

Imperial College London(伦敦帝国学院);Queen Mary University of London(伦敦玛丽女王大学);Telefónica Research(西班牙电信研究院);Samsung AI(三星人工智能中心)

Fan Mo, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Kleomenis Katevas, Soteris Demetriou, Ilias Leontiadis, Andrea Cavallaro, Hamed Haddadi

英文摘要:

We present DarkneTZ, a framework that uses an edge device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in conjunction with model partitioning to limit the attack surface against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Increasingly, edge devices (smartphones and consumer IoT devices) are equipped with pre-trained DNNs for a variety of applications. This trend comes with privacy risks as models can leak information about their training data through effective membership inference attacks (MIAs). We evaluate the performance of DarkneTZ, including CPU execution time, memory usage, and accurate power consumption, using two small and six large image classification models. Due to the limited memory of the edge device's TEE, we partition model layers into more sensitive layers (to be executed inside the device TEE), and a set of layers to be executed in the untrusted part of the operating system. Our results show that even if a single layer is hidden, we can provide reliable model privacy and defend against state of the art MIAs, with only 3% performance overhead. When fully utilizing the TEE, DarkneTZ provides model protections with up to 10% overhead.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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