公共物品博弈中的从众行为
Herd Behaviour in Public Goods Games
AI总结:
本文提出贝叶斯推断模型研究公共物品博弈中的搭便车问题,发现人类在中等规模群体中倾向于模仿和趋同而非利润最优化,揭示了合作通过顺应群体行为实现。
摘要:
当个体从共享资源、服务或公共物品中获益,却未按比例为其供给做出贡献时,搭便车问题便会出现。这种行为往往导致集体行动困境,因为个体在依赖他人贡献的同时追求个人利益。在本研究中,我们提出一个贝叶斯推断模型,用以阐明公共物品博弈(Public Goods Game)参与者的行为,该博弈是一个捕捉搭便车问题本质的概念框架。在此框架中,个体掌握关于群体对公共物品捐赠分布的信息。我们的模型基于如下前提:个体努力使其行动与群体的捐赠模式保持一致。我们的模型能够复现与中等规模群体(100人)实验中观察到的行为模式相似的模式,但无法复现更大规模(1000人)下的行为模式。我们的结果表明,在这些场景中,人类更偏好模仿和趋同行为,而非利润最优化。这些见解有助于理解合作是如何通过顺应群体行为而实现的。
英文摘要:
The problem of free-riding arises when individuals benefit from a shared resource, service, or public good without contributing proportionately to its provision. This conduct often leads to a collective action problem, as individuals pursue personal gains while relying on the contributions of others. In this study, we present a Bayesian inference model to elucidate the behaviour of participants in a Public Goods Game, a conceptual framework that captures the essence of the free-riding problem. Here, individuals possess information on the distribution of group donations to the public good. Our model is grounded in the premise that individuals strive to harmonise their actions with the group's donation patterns. Our model is able to replicate behavioural patterns that resemble those observed in experiments with midsized groups (100 people), but fails to replicate those for larger scales (1000 people). Our results suggest that, in these scenarios, humans prefer imitation and convergence behaviours over profit optimisation. These insights contribute to understanding how cooperation is achieved through alignment with group behaviour.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。