预测博弈中的相共存
Phase coexistence in a forecasting game
摘要：
个人的选择要么是基于个人经验，要么是基于同行提供的信息。后一种情况，导致个人符合大多数在他们的邻居。这种羊群行为可能非常有效地聚集分散的私人信息，从而揭示最优选择。然而，如果大多数人依赖于羊群效应，这种机制可能无法正确地聚集信息，导致大多数人采取错误的选择。我们在一个简单的互动代理模型中解决这些问题，这些代理的目标是对公共变量进行正确的预测，无论是寻求私人信息还是诉诸羊群行为。随着牧民比例的增加，该模型具有相变的特点，超过该状态，大多数代理人作出正确的预测与其中大多数是错误的共存。简单的战略考虑表明，这样一个系统的代理人自我组织的共存区域深处。正如最近的实证研究所发现的那样，在那里，代理人之间的共识往往比他们预测的目标要多得多。
英文摘要：
Individual choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided by peers. The latter case, causes individuals to conform to the majority in their neighborhood. Such herding behavior may be very efficient in aggregating disperse private information, thereby revealing the optimal choice. However if the majority relies on herding, this mechanism may dramatically fail to aggregate correctly the information, causing the majority adopting the wrong choice. We address these issues in a simple model of interacting agents who aim at giving a correct forecast of a public variable, either seeking private information or resorting to herding. As the fraction of herders increases, the model features a phase transition beyond which a state where most agents make the correct forecast coexists with one where most of them are wrong. Simple strategic considerations suggest that indeed such a system of agents self-organizes deep in the coexistence region. There, agents tend to agree much more among themselves than with what they aim at forecasting, as found in recent empirical studies.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
