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arXiv 2401.01304cs.CRcs.AI
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基于传感器融合的自动驾驶汽车GNSS欺骗攻击检测框架的实验验证

Experimental Validation of Sensor Fusion-based GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection Framework for Autonomous Vehicles

The University of Alabama(阿拉巴马大学)

Sagar Dasgupta, Kazi Hassan Shakib, Mizanur Rahman

AI总结:

本文验证了一种基于传感器融合的GNSS欺骗攻击检测框架,通过LSTM神经网络预测位置偏移和随机森林分类转弯两种策略,有效检测自动驾驶汽车面临的复杂GNSS欺骗攻击。

摘要:

本文验证了一种基于传感器融合的全球导航卫星系统(GNSS)欺骗攻击检测框架在自动驾驶汽车(AVs)中的性能。为收集数据,使用了一辆配备GNSS接收机和惯性测量单元(IMU)的车辆。该检测框架包含两种策略:第一种策略将预测的位置偏移(即连续两个时间戳之间行驶的距离)与基于惯性传感器的位置偏移进行比较。为此,将来自低成本车载惯性传感器(如加速度计和陀螺仪)的数据进行融合,并输入到长短期记忆(LSTM)神经网络中。第二种策略采用随机森林监督机器学习模型来检测和分类转弯,利用转向角传感器的输出区分左转弯和右转弯。在实验中,模拟了两种欺骗攻击模型:逐转弯和错误转弯。这些欺骗攻击被建模为SQL注入攻击,一旦成功实施,导航系统会将注入的虚假位置信息视为合法信息,同时无法检测到合法的GNSS信号。重要的是,在整个欺骗攻击过程中,IMU数据保持未受破坏状态。为测试检测框架的有效性,在阿拉巴马州塔斯卡卢萨市进行了实验,模拟城市道路结构。结果表明,该框架能够检测各种复杂的GNSS欺骗攻击,甚至包括缓慢位置漂移攻击。总体而言,实验结果展示了基于传感器融合的欺骗攻击检测方法在保护AVs免受GNSS欺骗威胁方面的鲁棒性和有效性。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we validate the performance of the a sensor fusion-based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attack detection framework for Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). To collect data, a vehicle equipped with a GNSS receiver, along with Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is used. The detection framework incorporates two strategies: The first strategy involves comparing the predicted location shift, which is the distance traveled between two consecutive timestamps, with the inertial sensor-based location shift. For this purpose, data from low-cost in-vehicle inertial sensors such as the accelerometer and gyroscope sensor are fused and fed into a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network. The second strategy employs a Random-Forest supervised machine learning model to detect and classify turns, distinguishing between left and right turns using the output from the steering angle sensor. In experiments, two types of spoofing attack models: turn-by-turn and wrong turn are simulated. These spoofing attacks are modeled as SQL injection attacks, where, upon successful implementation, the navigation system perceives injected spoofed location information as legitimate while being unable to detect legitimate GNSS signals. Importantly, the IMU data remains uncompromised throughout the spoofing attack. To test the effectiveness of the detection framework, experiments are conducted in Tuscaloosa, AL, mimicking urban road structures. The results demonstrate the framework's ability to detect various sophisticated GNSS spoofing attacks, even including slow position drifting attacks. Overall, the experimental results showcase the robustness and efficacy of the sensor fusion-based spoofing attack detection approach in safeguarding AVs against GNSS spoofing threats.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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