利用安全异构时间源检测GNSS异常行为
Detecting GNSS misbehavior leveraging secure heterogeneous time sources
AI总结：
针对民用GNSS脆弱性威胁关键系统的问题，提出结合安全远程网络授时源与本地精密振荡器的多层防御机制，无需改动现有接收机即可检测微小时间偏移的GNSS攻击，兼容性强易部署。
摘要：
民用全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）的脆弱性对各类关键系统构成威胁。GNSS接收机作为所属平台的组成部分，可利用外部信息检测GNSS攻击。具体而言，将GNSS接收机生成的时间与多个可信时间源进行交叉校验，可提供稳健可靠的定位、导航与授时（PNT）服务。本研究探索了安全远程网络授时服务商与本地精密振荡器的结合方案。这种多层防御机制能够检测出即使仅造成微小时间偏移的GNSS攻击，包括冷启动阶段发起的攻击。该系统无需修改现有GNSS接收机结构，对卫星星座与攻击者类型均无依赖，使得基于时间的GNSS信息数据验证可兼容现有接收机并易于部署。
英文摘要：
Civilian Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) vulnerabilities are a threat to a wide gamut of critical systems. GNSS receivers, as part of the encompassing platform, can leverage external information to detect GNSS attacks. Specifically, cross-checking the time produced by the GNSS receiver against multiple trusted time sources can provide robust and assured PNT. In this work, we explore the combination of secure remote, network-based time providers and local precision oscillators. This multi-layered defense mechanism detects GNSS attacks that induce even small time offsets, including attacks mounted in cold start. Our system does not require any modification to the current structure of the GNSS receiver, it is agnostic to the satellite constellation and the attacker type. This makes time-based data validation of GNSS information compatible with existing receivers and readily deployable.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
