Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are a popular decentralized exchange mechanism and have recently been the subject of much research, but major CFMMs give traders no privacy. Prior work proposes randomly splitting and shuffling trades to give some privacy to all users [Chitra et al. 2022], or adding noise to the market state after each trade and charging a fixed `privacy fee' to all traders [Frongillo and Waggoner 2018]. In contrast, we propose a noisy CFMM mechanism where users specify personal privacy requirements and pay personalized fees. We show that the noise added for privacy protection creates additional arbitrage opportunities. We call a mechanism priceable if there exists a privacy fee that always matches the additional arbitrage loss in expectation. We show that a mechanism is priceable if and only if the noise added is zero-mean in the asset amount. We also show that priceability and setting the right fee are necessary for a mechanism to be truthful, and that this fee is inversely proportional to the CFMM's liquidity.
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics(上海财经大学);H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology(佐治亚理工学院 H. 米尔顿·斯图尔特工业与系统工程学校)
Università degli Studi di Milano and Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy(米兰大学和米兰理工学院,意大利);University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada(渥太华大学,加拿大);Politecnico di Milano and Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy(米兰理工学院和米兰大学,意大利);Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy(米兰大学,意大利);Independent researcher(独立研究者)