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arXiv 2309.14652cs.GT
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为恒定函数做市商中隐私保护的个性化偏好定价

Pricing Personalized Preferences for Privacy Protection in Constant Function Market Makers

Mohak Goyal, Geoffrey Ramseyer

AI总结:

针对 CFMM 缺乏交易隐私的问题,本文提出支持用户个性化隐私要求与费用的噪声 CFMM,并刻画了可定价性条件及其与真实性和流动性的关系。

摘要:

恒定函数做市商(CFMM)是一种流行的去中心化交易机制,近来已成为大量研究的主题,但主流 CFMM 并不为交易者提供隐私。先前工作提出通过随机拆分和混洗交易来为所有用户提供一定程度的隐私(Chitra 等,2022),或在每笔交易后向市场状态添加噪声,并向所有交易者收取固定的“隐私费”(Frongillo 和 Waggoner,2018)。与之不同,我们提出一种带噪声的 CFMM 机制,使用户可以指定个人隐私要求并支付个性化费用。我们证明,为隐私保护而添加的噪声会产生额外的套利机会。如果存在一种隐私费,使其在期望意义上始终与额外套利损失相匹配,我们就称该机制是可定价的。我们证明,一个机制可定价,当且仅当所添加噪声在资产数量上是零均值的。我们还表明,可定价性和设定正确的费用是机制具备真实性的必要条件,并且该费用与 CFMM 的流动性成反比。

英文摘要:

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are a popular decentralized exchange mechanism and have recently been the subject of much research, but major CFMMs give traders no privacy. Prior work proposes randomly splitting and shuffling trades to give some privacy to all users [Chitra et al. 2022], or adding noise to the market state after each trade and charging a fixed `privacy fee' to all traders [Frongillo and Waggoner 2018]. In contrast, we propose a noisy CFMM mechanism where users specify personal privacy requirements and pay personalized fees. We show that the noise added for privacy protection creates additional arbitrage opportunities. We call a mechanism priceable if there exists a privacy fee that always matches the additional arbitrage loss in expectation. We show that a mechanism is priceable if and only if the noise added is zero-mean in the asset amount. We also show that priceability and setting the right fee are necessary for a mechanism to be truthful, and that this fee is inversely proportional to the CFMM's liquidity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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