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arXiv 2305.04589cs.GTcs.AI
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首选最大化与事前及事后公平性的结合

First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness

Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE)(高可信软件技术教育部重点实验室);Binghamton University(宾汉姆顿大学);Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute(伦斯勒理工学院);Peking University(北京大学);Guangzhou University(广州大学)

Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang

AI总结:

针对序数偏好下的多物品分配问题,设计了满足首选最大化与帕累托效率的随机机制,同时提供事前和事后公平性保证,并证明了不可能同时满足策略证明、事后PE、EF1和FCM。

摘要:

针对在给定序数偏好下将多个不可分割物品分配给一组智能体的分配问题,我们设计了满足首选最大化(FCM)的随机机制,即最大化被分配首选物品的智能体数量,同时满足帕累托效率(PE)。我们的机制还提供了事前和事后公平性的保证。广义急切波士顿机制是事前无嫉妒的,并且是事后至多一件物品无嫉妒(EF1)的。广义概率波士顿机制也是事后EF1的,并且满足事前效率而非公平性。我们还证明了没有策略证明机制能同时满足事后PE、EF1和FCM。通过这项工作,我们扩展了在分配问题中同时提供效率以及事前和事后公平性保证的前沿。

英文摘要:

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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