In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI - the ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief to refer to a field at the intersection of epistemology and ethics concerned with possible moral, practical, and other non-truth-related dimensions of belief. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents - both human and artificial - ought to believe, rather than with questions concerning whether beliefs meet certain evaluative standards such as being true, being justified, constituting knowledge, etc. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI (morally wronging someone in virtue of beliefs held about them); morally owed beliefs (beliefs that agents are morally obligated to hold); pragmatic and moral encroachment (cases where the practical or moral features of a belief is relevant to its epistemic status, and in our case specifically to whether an agent ought to hold the belief); and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven't yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.
When Ethics and Payoffs Diverge: LLM Agents in Morally Charged Social Dilemmas
ETH Zürich(苏黎世联邦理工学院);University of Zurich(苏黎世大学);Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学);University of Michigan(密歇根大学);Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tübingen(图宾根人工智能研究所);University of Toronto(多伦多大学);Vector Institute(向量研究所)
Judge Business School, University of Cambridge(剑桥大学贾奇商学院);Institute of Metabolic Science, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge(剑桥大学临床医学院代谢科学研究所);School of Business, University of Queensland(昆士兰大学商学院)
Machine Ethics: The Creation of a Virtuous Machine
人工智能(AI)最初是作为一种隐含的道德代理人开发的,用于解决简单而明确定义的任务,其中所有选项都是可预测的。然而,它现在是我们日常生活的一部分,为手机,相机,手表,恒温器,吸尘器,汽车等等供电。这引起了许多关注,一些学者和从业者强调人工智能的危险,并反对其发展为可以推理道德的道德代理人(例如,Bryson 2008; Johnson and Miller 2008; Sharkey 2017; Tonkens 2009; van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019)。即使我们承认潜在的威胁,与大多数其他学者(例如,Anderson and Anderson 2010; Moor 2006; Scheutz 2016; Wallach 2010),我们认为人工智能的进步不能停止,开发人员需要准备人工智能来维持明确的道德代理人,并在复杂和道德突出的环境中面对道德困境。
Cost-of-Ethics Crisis: Beliefs, Decisions, and Justifications in the Job Searches of Computer Science Students in Canada and the United States
University of Alberta(阿尔伯塔大学);University of Toronto(多伦多大学);Queen’s University(女王大学);University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学);University of Texas at Austin(德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校)
"Y'all are just too sensitive": A computational ethics approach to understanding how prejudice against marginalized communities becomes epistemic belief
Commercial AI, Conflict, and Moral Responsibility: A theoretical analysis and practical approach to the moral responsibilities associated with dual-use AI technology
University of California, San Diego(加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校)