让图灵大吃一惊？设计数字计算机用于道德负载的上下文
Taking Turing by Surprise? Designing Digital Computers for morally-loaded contexts
摘要：
从图灵匆忙驳回的洛夫莱斯夫人的反对意见中可以学到很多东西。数字计算机确实能使我们感到惊奇。就像一件艺术品一样，算法可以被设计成让我们质疑自己对世界的理解，或者我们在世界中的位置。有些人确实失去了这种惊讶的能力。这可能是恐惧，也可能是意识形态冲突的安慰。作为懒惰的规范动物，我们确实需要能够依靠权威来简化我们的推理：这是可以的。然而，旨在将我们从规范性参与的约束中解放出来的制度越来越复杂，可能会使我们越过一个不归路。如果由于缺乏规范性锻炼，我们的道德肌肉变得如此萎缩，以至于我们无法质疑我们的社会实践，该怎么办？本文提出了两个不同的规范性主张：1。决策支持系统的设计应该着眼于定期将我们从道德麻木中唤醒。2.如果没有深度的习惯来锚定模型的确定性，计算机对新事物的体验与人类产生重大惊喜的体验是非常不同的。当涉及到人工道德代理人的道德代理的形状时，这种不对称性具有关键的影响。令人担忧的不仅仅是他们可能会在道德上超越我们，不受习惯的束缚。怀疑人类与自治系统的道德轨迹是否仍然相容的主要原因，源于道德变革机制的不对称性。虽然在人类中，惊喜将继续在唤醒我们对道德变革的需求方面发挥重要作用，但在机器方面，认知过程将占据主导地位。这种不对称将转化为越来越不同的道德观，到了可能无法理解的地步。后一种前景足以让人怀疑自主道德主体的可取性。
英文摘要：
There is much to learn from what Turing hastily dismissed as Lady Lovelace s objection. Digital computers can indeed surprise us. Just like a piece of art, algorithms can be designed in such a way as to lead us to question our understanding of the world, or our place within it. Some humans do lose the capacity to be surprised in that way. It might be fear, or it might be the comfort of ideological certainties. As lazy normative animals, we do need to be able to rely on authorities to simplify our reasoning: that is ok. Yet the growing sophistication of systems designed to free us from the constraints of normative engagement may take us past a point of no-return. What if, through lack of normative exercise, our moral muscles became so atrophied as to leave us unable to question our social practices? This paper makes two distinct normative claims: 1. Decision-support systems should be designed with a view to regularly jolting us out of our moral torpor. 2. Without the depth of habit to somatically anchor model certainty, a computer s experience of something new is very different from that which in humans gives rise to non-trivial surprises. This asymmetry has key repercussions when it comes to the shape of ethical agency in artificial moral agents. The worry is not just that they would be likely to leap morally ahead of us, unencumbered by habits. The main reason to doubt that the moral trajectories of humans v. autonomous systems might remain compatible stems from the asymmetry in the mechanisms underlying moral change. Whereas in humans surprises will continue to play an important role in waking us to the need for moral change, cognitive processes will rule when it comes to machines. This asymmetry will translate into increasingly different moral outlooks, to the point of likely unintelligibility. The latter prospect is enough to doubt the desirability of autonomous moral agents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
