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arXiv 2302.07717cs.CRcs.SE
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场敏感数据流完整性

Field-sensitive Data Flow Integrity

So Shizukuishi, Yoshitaka Arahori, Katsuhiko Gondow

摘要:

尽管目前已经研究了许多针对内存漏洞攻击的防御方法,但如何实现高度兼容、精确、高效的防御仍然是一个有待解决的问题。事实上,现有的防御方法具有以下问题中的至少一个:它们(1)不能精确地保护结构字段,(2)招致高保护开销,和/或(3)由于对受保护程序强加存储器布局改变而不能保持与现有代码的兼容性。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的内存保护方法FIX感,旨在同时解决所有这些问题。我们的核心思想是执行内存保护的基础上,字段敏感的数据流的完整性。具体地说,我们的方法(1)计算每个内存对象的安全写-读关系,在结构-字段粒度,基于字段敏感的值流分析在编译时的保护程序。(2)在运行时,执行轻量级验证以确定由受保护程序执行的每个存储器读取是否属于在编译时为存储器对象计算的安全写入-读取关系。(3)该验证通过轻量级元数据管理来实现,轻量级元数据管理以结构字段粒度跟踪存储器写入,而不改变目标程序的存储器布局(尤其是结构字段布局)。

英文摘要:

Although numerous defenses against memory vulnerability exploits have been studied so far, highly-compatible, precise, and efficient defense is still an open problem. In fact, existing defense methods have at least one of the following problems: they (1) cannot precisely protect structure fields, (2) incur high protection overheads, and/or (3) cannot maintain compatibility with existing code due to imposing memory layout change on the protected program. In this paper, we propose a novel memory-protection method FIX-Sense that aims to solve all of these problems simultaneously. Our key idea is to perform memory protection based on field-sensitive data-flow integrity. Specifically, our method (1) computes a safe write-read relation for each memory object, at the structure-field granularity, based on field-sensitive value-flow analysis at the compile-time of the protected program. (2) At run-time, lightweight verification is performed to determine whether each memory read executed by the protected program belong to the safe write-read relation calculated for the memory object at compile time. (3) This verification is implemented by lightweight metadata management that tracks memory writes at the structure field granularity without changing the memory layout of the target program (especially the structure field layout).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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