Manipulations of return addresses on the stack are the basis for a variety of attacks on programs written in memory unsafe languages. Dual stack schemes for protecting return addresses promise an efficient and effective defense against such attacks. By introducing a second, safe stack to separate return addresses from potentially unsafe stack objects, they prevent attacks that, for example, maliciously modify a return address by overflowing a buffer. However, the security of dual stacks is based on the concealment of the safe stack in memory. Unfortunately, all current dual stack schemes are vulnerable to information disclosure attacks that are able to reveal the safe stack location, and therefore effectively break their promised security properties. In this paper, we present a new, leak-resilient dual stack scheme capable of withstanding sophisticated information disclosure attacks. We carefully study previous dual stack schemes and systematically develop a novel design for stack separation that eliminates flaws leading to the disclosure of safe stacks. We show the feasibility and practicality of our approach by presenting a full integration into the LLVM compiler framework with support for the x86-64 and ARM64 architectures. With an average of 2.7% on x86-64 and 0.0% on ARM64, the performance overhead of our implementation is negligible.
Membership Inference Attacks fueled by Few-Short Learning to detect privacy leakage tackling data integrity
University of Granada(格拉纳达大学);ADIA Lab(ADIA实验室);Andalusian Research Institute in Data Science and Computational Intelligence (DaSCI)(安达卢西亚数据科学与计算智能研究所(DaSCI))
An AI-Based Supervisory Measurement Integrity Validation Layer for Cyber-Resilient AC/DC Protection in Inverter-Based Microgrids
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto(多伦多大学电气与计算机工程系);Electric Power Engineering Department, Cairo University(开罗大学电力工程系);Department of Electrical Engineering, Khalifa University(哈利法大学电气工程系);Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering (CIISE), Concordia University(康卡迪亚大学信息系统工程研究所)
Are Neuro-Inspired Multi-Modal Vision-Language Models Resilient to Membership Inference Privacy Leakage?
The University of Alabama(阿拉巴马大学);Alabama Center for the Advancement of AI(阿拉巴马人工智能 advancement 中心);Trustworthy AI Lab(可信人工智能实验室);Department of Computer Science, The University of Alabama(计算机科学系)
Detecting RAG Extraction Attack via Dual-Path Runtime Integrity Game
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院信息工程研究所);School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学网络空间安全学院);Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications(北京邮电大学);Stanford University(斯坦福大学);North China Electric Power University(华北电力大学);AI Sec Lab, Beijing Chaitin Technology Co.,Ltd(北京长亭科技有限公司AI安全实验室)
Detile: Fine-Grained Information Leak Detection in Script Engines
内存泄漏攻击在利用内存损坏漏洞方面发挥着重要作用。通过分析最近的研究,我们观察到,绕过强制控制流完整性或尝试检测面向返回的编程的防御性解决方案需要将内存泄露攻击作为基本的第一步。然而,在检测此类信息泄漏方面的研究滞后。在本文中,我们解决了这个问题,并提出了一个细粒度的,自动检测的内存泄漏攻击脚本引擎的系统。基本观点如下:脚本语言,如Web浏览器中的JavaScript,是严格沙箱化的。他们必须不提供任何关于其上下文中的内存布局的见解。事实上,任何此类信息都可能代表正在进行的内存泄露攻击。因此,为了检测信息泄漏,我们的系统创建了一个克隆的脚本引擎进程与重新随机化的内存布局。克隆被检测为与原始进程同步。当执行内存泄漏以泄漏有关内存布局的信息时,两个进程的脚本上下文中会出现任何不一致。基于这种检测方法,我们已经设计并实现了Detile(\underline{i}信息\underline{le} aks的\underline{det}部分),在Windows 8.0/8.1上的Microsoft Internet Explorer 10/11中的JavaScript引擎的原型。实证评估表明,我们的工具可以成功地检测内存泄漏攻击,即使对这个专有软件。
Resilient Federated Chain: Transforming Blockchain Consensus into an Active Defense Layer for Federated Learning
Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence(计算机科学与人工智能系);Andalusian Research Institute in Data Science and Computational Intelligence (DaSCI)(数据科学与计算智能安达卢西亚研究 institute);University of Granada(格拉纳达大学)