arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1806.09496cs.CR
收藏

一种实现后向控制流完整性的泄漏恢复双栈方案

A Leak-Resilient Dual Stack Scheme for Backward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity

Philipp Zieris, Julian Horsch

摘要:

对堆栈上返回地址的操作是对用内存不安全语言编写的程序进行各种攻击的基础。保护返回地址的双栈方案保证了对此类攻击的有效防御。通过引入第二个安全堆栈来将返回地址与潜在的不安全堆栈对象分开,它们可以防止攻击,例如通过溢出缓冲区来恶意修改返回地址。然而,双栈的安全性是基于安全栈在内存中的隐蔽性。不幸的是,当前所有双堆栈方案都容易受到信息泄露攻击,这些攻击能够泄露安全堆栈位置,从而有效地破坏其承诺的安全属性。在本文中,我们提出了一个新的,泄漏弹性双栈方案能够抵御复杂的信息泄露攻击。我们仔细研究了以前的双堆栈计划,并系统地开发了一种新的堆栈分离设计,消除了导致安全堆栈泄露的缺陷。我们展示了我们的方法的可行性和实用性,提出了一个完整的集成到LLVM编译器框架,支持x86-64和ARM 64架构。在x86-64上平均为2.7%,在ARM 64上为0.0%,我们实现的性能开销可以忽略不计。

英文摘要:

Manipulations of return addresses on the stack are the basis for a variety of attacks on programs written in memory unsafe languages. Dual stack schemes for protecting return addresses promise an efficient and effective defense against such attacks. By introducing a second, safe stack to separate return addresses from potentially unsafe stack objects, they prevent attacks that, for example, maliciously modify a return address by overflowing a buffer. However, the security of dual stacks is based on the concealment of the safe stack in memory. Unfortunately, all current dual stack schemes are vulnerable to information disclosure attacks that are able to reveal the safe stack location, and therefore effectively break their promised security properties. In this paper, we present a new, leak-resilient dual stack scheme capable of withstanding sophisticated information disclosure attacks. We carefully study previous dual stack schemes and systematically develop a novel design for stack separation that eliminates flaws leading to the disclosure of safe stacks. We show the feasibility and practicality of our approach by presenting a full integration into the LLVM compiler framework with support for the x86-64 and ARM64 architectures. With an average of 2.7% on x86-64 and 0.0% on ARM64, the performance overhead of our implementation is negligible.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑