Windows Vista下数据流完整性的类型系统
A Type System for Data-Flow Integrity on Windows Vista
摘要:
Windows Vista操作系统实现了一个有趣的多级完整性模型。我们观察到,在这个模型中,受信任的代码可以归咎于任何信息流攻击,因此,有可能消除这种攻击的可信代码的静态分析。我们通过设计一个类型系统来形式化这个模型,该类型系统可以有效地在Windows Vista上执行数据流完整性。类型检查保证其内容是静态受信任的对象永远不包含不受信任的值,而不管环境中运行的是什么不受信任的代码。WindowsVista的一些运行时访问检查对于可靠性是必要的;其他的是多余的,可以优化掉。
英文摘要:
The Windows Vista operating system implements an interesting model of multi-level integrity. We observe that in this model, trusted code can be blamed for any information-flow attack; thus, it is possible to eliminate such attacks by static analysis of trusted code. We formalize this model by designing a type system that can efficiently enforce data-flow integrity on Windows Vista. Typechecking guarantees that objects whose contents are statically trusted never contain untrusted values, regardless of what untrusted code runs in the environment. Some of Windows Vista's runtime access checks are necessary for soundness; others are redundant and can be optimized away.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。