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arXiv 2302.04949cs.GT
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几乎纳什序贯协商

Almost-Nash Sequential Bargaining

Gokul Dharan, Hunter Guru, Michael Sun

摘要:

在2017年的一篇论文中,后来在网络和互联网经济学会议上发表了题为“社会选择的顺序审议”的论文,作者提出了一种机制,在这种机制中,一系列代理人的任务是就一组决策S进行谈判。基于纳什讨价还价的假设,并假设决策空间遵循中位数图,作者构造了一个鲁棒的算法,该算法近似于使整个人口的社会成本最小化的决策。在本文中,我们简要概述了背景理论,本文建立在从纳什的基础工作,社会选择的结果,在孔多塞机制成立。在此基础上,我们考虑了在不同的偏离纳什均衡的情况下,本文结果的稳定性。这些偏差可能是悲观的,在不平等的讨价还价能力(比如在劳动力市场)的背景下,或建设性的,如在舆论动态的背景下。我们的分析是在模拟的背景下进行的,我们希望将这些模拟的结果形式化,以了解我们模拟之外的空间中更一般的性质。

英文摘要:

In a 2017 paper, later presented at the Web and Internet Economics conference, titled ``Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice", the authors propose a mechanism in which a series of agents, are tasked to negotiate over a set of decisions S. Building on assumptions of Nash Bargaining and assuming the decision space follows the median graph, the authors constructed a robust algorithm which approximates the decision which minimizes the social cost to the entire population. In this paper, we give a brief overview of the background theory which this paper builds upon from foundational work from Nash, and social choice results which hold true in Condorcet mechanisms. Following this analysis, we consider the stability of the results in the paper with different deviations from Nash equilibrium. These deviations could be pessimal, in the context of unequal bargaining power (say in a labor market) or constructive, as in the context of opinion dynamics. Our analysis is observatory, in the context of simulations, and we hope to formalize the results of these simulations to get an understanding of more general properties in spaces beyond our simulation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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