Nash讨价还价问题中的标度不变性与平移方差
Scale invariance versus translation variance in Nash bargaining problem
摘要:
纳什的解决方案在他的著名文章的谈判问题呼吁最大化的产品的边际效用是重新审查;不同的论点线支持这样一个解决方案是建议由直接或更直接的推理,并提出了一个猜想,这意味着唯一的算法,即他的解决方案。还提出了其他可供选择的劣算法。本文认为,效用函数的标度不变原理应该也可以应用于此,即效用重新标度u '= a*u是允许的,而平移,给效用函数u'= u+b增加一个常数则不能应用于此,因为它不是不变的,并导致矛盾的行为。最后,特殊情况下的所有权和公用事业,交易预计不会发生,因为没有是有利可图的检查,然后被证明是符合规模不变原理。
英文摘要:
Nash's solution in his celebrated article on the bargaining problem calling for maximization of product of marginal utilities is revisited; a different line of argument supporting such a solution is suggested by straightforward or more direct reasoning, and a conjecture is raised which purports uniqueness of algorithm, namely his solution. Other alternative inferior algorithms are also suggested. It is argued in this article that the scale invariance principle for utility functions should and could be applied here, namely that utility rescaling u'=a*u is allowed, while translations, adding a constant to utility functions u'=u+b could not be applied here, since it is not invariant and leads to contradictory behavior. Finally, special situations of ownership and utilities, where trading is predicted not to take place at all because none is profitable are examined, and then shown to be consistent with the scale invariance principle.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。